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PARTICIPATION  AS  A  THEORY  OF  EMPLOYMENT
Matthew T. Bodie*
ABSTRACT
The concept of employment is an important legal category, not only for
labor and employment law, but also for intellectual property law, torts, crimi-
nal law, and tax.  The right-to-control test has dominated the debate over the
definition of “employee” since its origins in the master-servant doctrine.
However, the test no longer represents our modern notion of what it means to
be an employee.  This change has played itself out in research on the theory of
the firm, which has shifted from a model of control to a model of participa-
tion in a team production process.  This Article uses the theory of the firm
literature to provide a new doctrinal definition for “employee” based on the
concept of participation rather than control.  The participation test better
delineates the boundaries of employment and provides a framework for
addressing the stresses on firms and workers that are rife within the modern
economy.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of employment plays an important role across the
legal landscape.  Most obviously, labor and employment law protec-
tions provided under local, state, and federal law are limited to those
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contracting parties that are defined as employees.1  However, many
other areas of law draw distinctions based on the fact that the actor
was an employee, or that the actions were taken within the scope of
employment.  Common law doctrines or statutory provisions in intel-
lectual property,2 criminal law,3 torts,4 and tax5 use the concept of
employment in assigning critical rights and liabilities.  Although these
regimes are not generally thought of as labor and employment law,
they invest the employment relationship with even further legal
meaning.
Because the same concept of “employment” is used across legal
contexts, one’s intuition is that the concept would remain largely con-
sistent even in its variegated uses.  And this has largely been true.  The
concept of control has served as the unifying idea behind the use of
“employee” and “employment” in different contexts.6  The common
law “control test” comes out of the original conceptions of master and
servant from pre-industrial English law, and the Supreme Court has
used this test as the default definition of the term “employee” in fed-
eral statutes.7  However, the control test is not the unanimous answer,
1 See, e.g., Marc Linder, What Is an Employee?  Why It Does, But Should Not, Matter, 7
LAW & INEQ. 155, 157–58 (1989) (“The variety of benefits and protections . . . condi-
tioned on the existence of an employment relationship is impressive: unemployment
compensation, workers compensation, collective bargaining rights, minimum wages
and maximum hours, social security, pensions, occupational safety and health, and
anti-discrimination protection.” (footnotes omitted)).
2 The “work-for-hire” doctrine is the most prominent. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(2006).  For further discussion, see infra Section I.D.
3 The doctrine of “enterprise liability” renders an organization liable for the
crimes of its employees. See infra Section I.C.
4 Employers have long been liable for the torts of their employees committed
within the scope of employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See infra
Section I.B.
5 Employees are treated differently within tax law for a variety of purposes,
including withholding, benefit plans, and social security payroll taxes. See infra
Section I.E.
6 It should also be noted that the definition of “employment” is limited to those
relationships that courts have deemed to be “economic” or “market-oriented” in char-
acter.  For example, prison labor, work within families, and student labor have been
excluded from the definition because they do not take place within the labor market.
As Noah Zatz has pointed out, “employment law systematically faces disputes over
both how to draw a market/nonmarket distinction and whether that distinction matters
legally.”  Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Eco-
nomic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 862 (2008).  This
Article addresses the issue of whether work that is considered “economic” is con-
ducted within or outside of an employment relationship.
7 See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003)
(interpreting employee under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)); Nation-
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and in fact it may be losing its firm grip on the category.  Courts have
long used the “economic realities” test in interpreting the broader
definition provided under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).8  In
addition, the D.C. Circuit recently installed an “entrepreneurial
opportunities” test that has received support from the Restatement
(Third) of Employment Law.9  Foreign jurisdictions have looked to the
concept of “economic dependence.”10  Other jurists and scholars have
argued that there should not be any one definition of employment,
and that instead the term should be adapted to fit the needs of the
particular statutory, regulatory, or common law regime.11
This Article argues that there is a consistent meaning to the idea
of employment, but it is not the control test.  The meaning comes not
from looking at employees but rather at the firm that employs them.
Ever since Ronald Coase’s The Nature of the Firm,12 economists and
legal scholars have puzzled over why the law created firms that stand
outside the market.  The purpose of firms, Coase famously answered,
is to avoid transaction costs by allowing the parties to organize in a
hierarchical manner without the need for prices or specific con-
tracts.13  As Coase put it: “If a workman moves from department Y to
department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices,
wide Mut. Ins. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (interpreting the definition of
“employee” under ERISA); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
751–52 (1989) (interpreting the scope of the work-for-hire doctrine).
8 See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987) (using
the “economic realities” test to interpret “employee” in the context of the FLSA).
9 FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (arguing
that the Board and the circuit had “shift[ed the] emphasis away from the unwieldy
control inquiry in favor of a more accurate proxy: whether the putative independent
contractors have significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss” (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOY-
MENT LAW § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009), available at http://www.ali.org/00021
333/Employment%20Law%20TD%20No%202%20-%20Revised%20-%20September
%202009.pdf.
10 See Guy Davidov, Who is a Worker?, 34 INDUS. L.J. 57, 59 (2005) (discussing the
use of the concept of dependence in British law).
11 See, e.g., Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that the economic realities test be exchanged for a test as to the
statute’s purpose); Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1914)
(“It is true that the statute uses the word ‘employed,’ but it must be understood with
reference to the purpose of the act, and where all the conditions of the relation
require protection, protection ought to be given.”); Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law
Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 356 (2001) (arguing that the concept of employment should be
disregarded and other proxies for coverage should take its place).
12 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
13 Id. at 388.
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but because he is ordered to do so.”14  Less well known is that Coase
then looked to the legal definition of employee to determine whether
his transaction costs theory was supported in practice.15  He found
that it was.  Since the “control” test was based on the employer’s ability
to require its employees to take specific actions, he concluded, “[w]e
thus see that it is the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal
concept of ‘employer and employee,’ just as it was in the economic
concept which was developed above.”16
Coase’s approach to the theory of the firm was only the begin-
ning.  In fact, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz famously rejected
Coase’s workman example.17  Scholars have continued to place impor-
tance on the role of employees within the firm in defining what a firm
is and why it has independent existence.18  This rich literature, how-
ever, has been largely ignored when it comes to defining the concept
of employment.19  This Article seeks to correct that failing.  The the-
14 Id. at 387.
15 Id. at 403 (“We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in
practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and ser-
vant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”).
16 Id. at 404.
17 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972) (“Telling an employee to type
this letter rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this
brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread.  I have no contract to continue to
purchase from the grocer and neither the employer nor the employee is bound by
any contractual obligations to continue the relationship.”).
18 See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 265, 284 (1998) (“From the point of view of their internal organization,
firms are aggregates of individuals . . . .  From the point of view of the markets in
which they act as purchasers and sellers, firms act as entities.”).
19 A notable exception is Guy Davidov, who has discussed the concept of joint
production and incomplete contracts in developing a theory of employment.  Guy
Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need
of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 377–87, 378 n.79, 383–87 nn.101–17 (2002)
(citing and discussing the works of prominent figures in the field of law and econom-
ics such as Alchian and Demsetz, Coase, and Williamson).  Tim Glynn has discussed
how Coase’s work on the firm explains the shift to smaller firms and enterprise disag-
gregation.  Glynn argued that the rise in transaction costs from legal regulations such
as labor and employment laws led many employers to outsource the employment rela-
tionship onto fly-by-night subcontractors, who often dissolve or disappear when faced
with litigation.  Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment Law?  Account-
ability for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 207–15 (2011).  Scott Masten examined the definition of employ-
ment in assessing the legal significance of the firm in practice. See Scott E. Masten, A
Legal Basis for the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM 196 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney
G. Winter eds., 1991).  I endeavor to do the converse: examine the theory of the firm
literature in assessing the definition of employment.
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ory of the firm contains a critical insight: the idea of employment is
based not on our notions of employees, but rather on our notions of
employers.  There can be no employee without an employer.20  The
theory of the firm literature demonstrates that the employer is a firm,
and that the concept of employment is critical in determining what a
firm is and why it continues to exist.
Using the theory of the firm literature to demarcate the bounda-
ries between employee and independent contractor may appear at
first to be a tedious and inconsequential exercise.  But its theoretical
and practical implications are massive.  The sociological stability of
the employment relationship has seen significant erosion, as more
companies seek to outsource their chain of production and more
workers enjoy only temporary employment.21  At the same time,
nationwide firms are placing greater importance on their economic
brands, and employees are critical representatives of their companies
when it comes to their brand’s value and influence.22  We grow closer
to a potential “death of employment”23 at the same time that multina-
tional corporations have more economic power (and employees) than
ever.  These pressures ask us to consider what, if anything, about the
concept of “employment” is worth saving.
This Article argues that the proper definition of employee is not
the control test, the economic realities test, or the entrepreneurial
opportunities test.  Instead, the concept of employment has in fact
been and should henceforth be used to differentiate between mem-
bers and nonmembers of an economic firm.  In other words, employ-
ees are participants in a common economic enterprise organized into
a business entity.  This participation-based definition provides the best
rationale for the use of the “employee” category in areas of law such as
20 In fact, the standard statutory definition of “employee” is the following exer-
cise in passive voice: one who is employed by an employer. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(6) (2006) (defining employee as “any individual employed by an employer”).
21 See, e.g., Julia Tomassetti, Who Is a Worker? Partisanship, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, and the Social Content of Employment, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 815, 843 (2012)
(“The long-term, direct, full-time, wage-labor bargain between one employer and a
group of employees within proprietary firm boundaries was briefly—between the
1950s and 1970s—the politically dominant, concrete form that relations in produc-
tion assumed within capitalist relations of production in the United States.”); Peter
Coy et al., The Disposable Worker, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 18, 2010, at 33 (dis-
cussing trends of temporary employment in the wake of the financial crisis).
22 See Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying Into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 1179, 1183 (2010).
23 Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 99, 100 n.4 (1998) (explaining that, along with other changes in the labor market,
the use of “nonemployment” work relations is increasing).
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intellectual property, tax, and torts.  Moreover, the participation the-
ory explains why labor and employment law protections are based on
employment status: these protections are designed to make firms
more economically responsible for their participants.  Because
employees participate in the common economic enterprise as organ-
ized into a firm, the firm in turn must take care of its employees
within that common enterprise.
Part I of the Article examines where (and why) the concepts of
“employee” and “employment” are used within the law.  Part II sets
out the different doctrinal definitions of the terms “employee” and
“scope of employment,” and also examines the theories behind these
definitions.  Part III provides an overview of the theory of the firm
literature and the role of employees within that literature.  Part IV
uses the theory of the firm to develop a new definition of employment
within the law based on participation.  Finally, Part V briefly considers
the future of the concept of “employment” in the law.
I. THE CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE LAW
The role of “employment” within the law extends beyond the eas-
ily identifiable categories of labor and employment law.  This Part
examines the role that employment serves in defining a variety of
legal regimes.
A. Labor and Employment Law
Lawmakers have used the concept of employment to create a set
of rights within the law that provide protections to those defined as
employees.  Prohibitions against race, sex, age, and disability discrimi-
nation,24 below-minimum wages,25 dangerous working conditions,26
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
See also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) (providing similar protections against age dis-
crimination within the employment relationship); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (providing
similar protections against disability discrimination).
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retirement funding requirements,27 and attacks on collective activ-
ity,28 among others,29 are limited to employees.  State employment
provisions such as workers’ compensation and unemployment com-
pensation are also limited to employees.  These statutory schemes are
designed to provide protections to employees as employees and not to
any other groups, even if those outside the employee category might
benefit from the scheme.
Along with using employment to define vicarious liability (dis-
cussed below in Part B), the common law also has certain doctrines
that are limited to employment.  The tort of wrongful discharge, for
example, provides rights to employees—not independent contrac-
tors.30  And employment at-will is a common law doctrine that is
arguably separate from the traditional set of rules for contract inter-
pretation.31  In addition, under agency law employees have a fiduciary
duty of loyalty to their employers.32  This duty generally requires the
25 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (providing minimum wage and overtime protections
for employees).
26 See id. § 654(a) (requiring employers to “furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards”).
27 See, e.g., id. § 1053 (providing for minimum vesting standards for employee
retirement accounts).
28 See id. § 158(a)(1), (3) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 157 of this title; . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization . . . .”).
29 There are other federal statutory protections, as well as numerous state and
local protections, that are limited to employees.
30 For a discussion of the tort of wrongful discharge, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009), available at http://www
.ali.org/00021333/Employment%20Law%20TD%20No%202%20-%20Revised%20-%
20September%202009.pdf (“The vast majority of jurisdictions recognize some form of
the tort of employer discipline in violation of public policy, usually in discharge
cases.”).
31 The employment at-will rule is a default provision in employment contracts
that the relationship can be terminated at any time by either party. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008).  The at-will rule
may even be considered a “sticky” default—namely, a default rule that requires more
explicit or onerous expressions of intent to overcome. See Deborah A. DeMott, Invest-
ing in Work: Wilkes as an Employment Law Case, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 497, 498 (2011)
(arguing that employment at-will may be a “sticky” default); David Millon, Default
Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment at Will Versus Job Security,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1028–30 (1998) (exploring the argument that the default rule
should be changed from at-will employment to a “just cause” regime because the just
cause regime may better represent an efficient outcome between the parties).
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958); Terry A. O’Neill, Employees’
Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency Debate, 25 CONN. L. REV. 681, 685 (1993)
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employee not to compete directly with the employer while still an
employee.33
B. Vicarious Liability in Tort
The concept of employment is used as the basic dividing line in
the doctrine of respondeat superior.  An employer is liable for the acts
of its employees committed within the scope of employment, but it is
generally not liable for the acts of independent contractors that are
working with it.34  Respondeat superior has its roots in early master-
servant doctrine, in which a master was liable for harms caused by the
actions of his servant.35  The doctrine continues in the modern com-
mon law, with most courts using the term “employee” in place of “ser-
vant.”  Although many different justifications for the doctrine have
been given, most center around the responsibility for or control of the
employer over the employee.36  Employers can also be liable for the
torts of independent contractors, but generally only under one of
three conditions: (1) the employer is negligent in “selecting,
instructing, or supervising the contractor;” (2) the employer has a
nondelegable duty of care to the public as a whole or the particular
plaintiff; or (3) the work done by the contractor for the employer is
“specially” or “inherently” dangerous.37  United States common law
used to follow the “fellow servant” rule, in which the employer was
(“All employees owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their employer—be the employer a
sole proprietor, a partnership, a close corporation, or a large, publicly traded
corporation.”).
33 O’Neill, supra note 32, at 695 (“Until his employment has terminated, . . . he
may not engage in actual competition against his employer.”).  Enhanced remedies,
including disgorgement of compensation paid during the period of disloyalty, are
available in some jurisdictions under the “faithless servant” doctrine. See, e.g., Astra
USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36, 47 (Mass. 2009) (explaining that an employee’s
violation of duty to the employer results in forfeit[ure] of “any right to compensation
for services” (quoting Murray v. Beard, 7 N.E. 553 (N.Y. 1886))); Charles A. Sullivan,
Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary
Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777, 779–80 (discussing the elements of breach and remedy
associated with faithless servant doctrine).
34 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) (“An employer is subject to
liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their
employment.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965) (“Except as stated in
§§ 410–429, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical
harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.”).
35 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *417 (1765).
36 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at
499–501 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1965).  These are the three
primary circumstances; the employer is also liable when it has performed a contract
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absolved of liability to an employee for an injury caused by a fellow
employee.38  However, this rule has generally been abolished and/or
rendered obsolete by workers’ compensation statutes.39
C. Criminal Liability
Business organizations may be criminally responsible, as well as
liable in tort, for the misdeeds of their employees under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.40  Corporations and other business entities
are guilty of crimes committed by their employees if such crimes were
committed in the scope of employment.  In order to satisfy the mens
rea requirement, courts have additionally required that the employee
have acted with the intent to benefit the business entity.41  Although
the doctrine has faced steady criticism over the years, it has become
“firmly entrenched as, more or less, the across-the-board rule of enter-
prise liability for all manner of crimes.”42  However, the de jure rule
masks a more complex reality.  Courts and prosecutors have in prac-
tice adopted a narrower standard of liability when it comes to institu-
tional guilt.  At the front end, a series of Department of Justice memos
over the last decade chronicled the attempts to demarcate when cor-
using independent contractors when those services were accepted in the belief that
they were to be performed by the employer and its employees. Id. § 429.
38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 474 (1958):
A master is not liable to a servant or subservant who, while acting within the
scope of his employment or in connection therewith, is injured solely by the
negligence of a fellow servant in the performance of acts not involving a
violation of the master’s non-delegable duties, unless the servant was
coerced or deceived into serving, was too young to appreciate the risks, or
was employed in violation of statute.
39 KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 575–76; J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The
Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1487 (1987) (reviewing WIL-
LIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
(1987)) (“[T]he fellow servant rule is like a mastodon preserved in a glacier—it was
rendered obsolete by workers’ compensation, and, given the general trend of twenti-
eth century tort law, there can be no question that if workers’ compensation were
abolished today few courts would follow the fellow servant rule in industrial accident
cases.”).
40 See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495
(1909).
41 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962)
(describing the requirements as elements of liability taken from civil tort law).
42 Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 475–76 (2006); see also Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994) (stating that the existing legal
regime closely approximates a rule of “pure strict vicarious liability” (citations
omitted)).
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porations should be charged with crimes.43  All of these guidelines
required more than mere respondeat superior liability.44  At the back
end, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines assessed punishment for corpo-
rate guilt based on whether “an individual within high-level personnel
of the unit participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the
offense; or tolerance of the offense by substantial authority personnel
was pervasive throughout such [entity].”45  Commentators have noted
a change from vicarious liability to more of a negligence standard as
to corporate management’s role in overseeing internal investiga-
tions.46  This move has had both supporters and critics.47  However,
43 See Memorandum of Deputy Attorney Gen. Mark R. Filip, Principles of Fed.
Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. 4 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf; Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen.
Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep’t Components, Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus.
Orgs. 4 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mc
nulty_memo.pdf; Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Larry D. Thompson to
Heads of Dep’t Components, Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Jan. 20,
2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], available at http://www.albany.edu/
acc/courses/acc695spring2008/thompson%20memo.pdf.
44 The Thompson Memorandum listed the following factors in determining
when to charge a corporation:
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense . . . ;
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation . . . ;
3. the corporation’s history of similar conduct . . . ;
4. the corporation’s [cooperation and willingness to waive] attorney-client
[privilege] and work product protection . . . ;
5. the existence . . . of [a] compliance program . . . ;
6. the corporation’s remedial actions . . . ;
7. collateral consequences [of a charge, such as]. . . harm to shareholders,
pension holders and employees . . . ;
8. the adequacy of [prosecuting the individuals involved;] and
9. the adequacy of civil or regulatory enforcement.”
Thompson Memorandum, supra note 43, at 3.  Factor 4 became quite controversial,
as courts became concerned that the federal government was pressuring corporate
leaders into giving up attorney-client protections for their employees in order to spare
a corporate criminal charge. See, e.g., Unites States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.
2008) (finding that “the government deprived [employee] defendants of their right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment by causing KPMG to impose conditions on
the advancement of legal fees to defendants, to cap the fees, and ultimately to end
payment”).
45 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(b)(1)(A) (2012).
46 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-
Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 572 (2005) (“[A]t least since the adoption of
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) in 1991, the U.S. legal regime has
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the prevalent criminal liability rule remains based on respondeat
superior.
D. Intellectual Property
The term “intellectual property” refers to a wide range of infor-
mation to which specific legal rights have attached.  In some cases,
intellectual property is generated by a single individual: an author
writing alone in her home, or an inventor toiling away in the garage.
However, in many cases, intellectual property is generated by specific
individuals who are working within the context of a larger firm.  How
the rights to that “property” are divvied up has significant legal and
economic ramifications, particularly for firms and individual
employees.48
Federal law establishes ownership rights for copyrighted works.
The “work-for-hire” doctrine was originally established in the 1909
Copyright Act, as that law specified that the author of a copyrighted
work “shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire.”49
The Copyright Act of 1976 continued this doctrine, specifying that the
employer is considered the author of any work made for hire unless
expressly agreed otherwise.50  The 1976 Act defines “work made for
hire” as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment.”51  This rule of ownership can only be altered by a
signed, written document that expressly changes it.52
been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-
based organizational liability.”).
47 For support for a deterrence-based approach, see Vikramaditya S. Khanna,
Should the Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1224 (2003) (“Corpo-
rate liability improves deterrence when agents are judgment-proof because it places
corporate assets at risk and thereby forces the corporation to internalize the social
costs of wrongdoing.”).  For criticism of the monitoring-based approach, see Krawiec,
supra note 46, at 614 (“I conclude that the U.S. legal regime’s move away from strict
vicarious liability to internal compliance-based liability is unjustified by either theory
or empirical evidence.”).
48 See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS 127–29 (2004) (discuss-
ing disputes over ownership of human capital).
49 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 (repealed
1976).
50 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer
or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for pur-
poses of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”).
51 Id. § 101.
52 Id. § 201(b).
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The default rule for patent law is that the employee who invents
the patent is the author, not the employer.53  However, the employer
is free to contract with employees explicitly for the rights to all inven-
tions created within the scope of employment.  Even without an
explicit contract, judges have found something akin to a work-for-hire
doctrine when an employee is hired to work on a specific invention or
problem; courts are more likely to conclude that the employee was
hired to invent and therefore the firm owned all patents through an
implied contract.54  In addition, under the shop-right doctrine,
employers enjoy a nonexclusive right to use the patent without having
to compensate the employee.  A shop right arises when the employee
has created the invention on the job using the employer’s materials.55
Trademark presents a special connection among the firm, its
employees, and intellectual property.  Trademark protection enables
a group of people to join together and be recognized as a common
enterprise without fearing that their brand name and reputation will
be poached by outsiders.  Just as patent and copyright protections
concern the allocation of information rights between employee and
firm, trademark concerns the allocation of good will and reputational
rights between employee and firm.56  Trademarks enable firms to use
and transfer reputational assets over to the firm, and thus deprive
individual employees of their ability to hold up the firm or exploit the
trade dress separately.57
Finally, trade secret law allocates the ownership of softer intellec-
tual capital between employees and the firm.  The Uniform Trade
Secret Act defines misappropriation of a trade secret as acquiring the
trade secret either by improper means or “under circumstances giving
53 The patent must be registered by the individual inventor. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111,
115 (2006) (discussing oath taken as part of patent process that the registrant is the
“original and first inventor”).
54 CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE 181–82 (Daniel Ernst & Thomas A.
Green eds., 2009); see also Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 3, 15 (2004):
In the absence of explicit contractual terms requiring an assignment, an
implied duty to assign may be found.  Courts have tended to recognize such
an implied duty to assign patent rights in situations where an employee
hired to solve a problem engages in research, and the invention relates to
that effort.
55 FISK, supra note 54, at 118; Burk, supra note 54, at 16.
56 Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 363–64 (2009).
57 Id. at 376.
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rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.”58  Although the
Act applies to any “person,”59 employees in particular are expected to
keep confidential any of the employer’s trade secrets to which they are
exposed during the course of employment.60  Indeed, employees are
primary targets for the protections against trade secret misappropria-
tion.  A study of trade secret litigation found that over eighty-five per-
cent of trade secret cases involved  alleged misappropriators who were
either current or former employees or business partners.61  Employ-
ees are generally presumed to have an implied duty to keep any trade
secrets to which they are exposed confidential.62  Moreover, the doc-
trine of “inevitable disclosure of trade secrets” has applied in some
jurisdictions to employees who leave the company but (according to
the court) must inevitably use the trade secrets they have learned at
their old position.63
58 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(B)(II) (amended 1985) [hereinafter
UTSA].  The Act is model civil legislation that has been adopted at least in part by
forty-seven jurisdictions.
59 UTSA, supra note 58, § 1(3) (defining “person” as “a natural person, corpora-
tion, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government,
governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity”).
60 O’Neill, supra note 32, at 695 n.65 (“Courts have held that when an employer
discloses its trade secret to an employee in the course of employment, the employee is
bound by his fiduciary duty of loyalty not to use or reveal it for his own personal
benefit.”).
61 David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 294 (2010).  The study also found that trade secret
owners were “twice as likely to prevail on a motion for preliminary relief when they
sued employees as when they sued business partners.” Id.  However, owners were also
“over 70% more likely to lose a motion to dismiss when they sued employees than
business partners.” Id.
62 See Unistar Corp. v. Child, 415 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (“The
law will import into every contract of employment a prohibition against the use of a
trade secret by the employee for his own benefit, to the detriment of his employer, if
the secret was acquired by the employee in the course of his employment.”); Derek P.
Martin, Comment, An Employer’s Guide to Protecting Trade Secrets from Employee Misappro-
priation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 949, 953 (“For most employees the law presumes a confi-
dential relationship between employer and employee for the purposes of protecting
trade secrets.”).
63 See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A]
plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that
defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade
secrets.”); Rebecca J. Berkun, Comment, The Dangers of the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclo-
sure in Pennsylvania, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 157, 157 (2003) (“The doctrine of
inevitable disclosure restricts an employee’s future employment if that employee will
inevitably use a former employer’s trade secrets in the course of the future
employment.”).
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E. Tax
Firms are expected to differentiate between employees and inde-
pendent contractors over a host of provisions, including whether taxes
need to be withheld,64 whether the firm must pay a share of Social
Security and Medicare (FICA)65 and unemployment (FUTA) taxes66
for the worker, and whether the workers count as employees for bene-
fit plan purposes.67  The IRS defines employees based on the common
law control test.68  The consequences of a misclassification can be
extremely costly, as the business is then subject to the mandatory back-
tax formula.69  In fact, Congress was moved to create a “safe harbor”
for employers when it came to the employee-independent contractor
distinction.70  The upshot of these requirements is to give the firm tax
responsibilities for its employees, while giving independent contrac-
tors tax responsibilities for themselves.
II. THE DEFINITION OF EMPLOYMENT IN DOCTRINE AND THEORY
The categories of “employee” and “the scope of employment”
define certain contours within various areas of the law.  For many stat-
utory schemes, the “employee” category does all of the work; once the
identity of the person as an employee has been established, that per-
son is entitled to the rights conveyed upon employees and can bring
claims for violations of those rights.  In other areas of the law, how-
ever, the person and the context are relevant to establishing the legal
category; therefore, both “employee” and “scope of employment” are
necessary to establish.  Both categories are considered below.
64 26 U.S.C. §§ 3401(c), 3402 (2006).
65 Id. §§ 3101, 3121(d).
66 Id. §§ 3301, 3306(i).
67 Id. § 410(a).
68 Id. § 3121(d)(2) (defining an employee as, among other definitions, “any indi-
vidual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the
employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee”); 26 C.F.R.
§ 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (2012) (finding an employment relationship “when the person
for whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual
who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work
but also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished”); see 26
U.S.C. § 3306(i) (stating that “the term ‘employee’ has the meaning assigned to such
term by section 3121(d)”); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298–99 (laying out a
twenty-factor test to aid in “determining whether an individual is an employee under
the common law rules”).
69 26 U.S.C. § 3509(a).
70 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2885.
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A. Defining “Employee”
1. The Common Law “Control” Test
The “control” test is the dominant standard for employment,
both nationally and internationally.71  The test finds its historical roots
in the definition of “servant” in English common law.  William Black-
stone describes the relationship between master and servant as one of
the three “great relations in private life,” along with husband and wife
and parent and child.72  The relationship was used primarily not for
contractual purposes, but rather to establish the duties each owed to
the other and to establish when a master was liable for the actions of
the servant.  The master was certainly liable if the servant committed
the act “by the command or encouragement of his master,”73 but lia-
bility extended beyond such direct orders.  Blackstone offered the fol-
lowing example and justification: “If an innkeeper’s servants rob his
guests, the master is bound to restitution: for as there is a confidence
reposed in him, that he will take care to provide honest servants, his
negligence is a kind of implied consent to the robbery . . . .”74
Under what circumstances would one who contracts for labor be
liable for the acts of the laborer?  Respondeat superior does not apply
generally to the agency relationship; such vicarious liability is reserved
for the master-servant relationship.75  English courts based the defini-
71 Davidov, supra note 19, at 367 (“Control/subordination is still the leading (and
sometimes the single) characteristic of employment relationships in many
countries.”).
72 BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at 410.
73 Id. at 417.
74 Id. (citations omitted); see WILLIAM PALEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL
AND AGENT 126 (J.H. Lloyd ed., 3d ed. 1840) (“A master is responsible for the negli-
gence or unskillfulness of a servant acting in the prosecution of his service, though
not under his immediate direction.”). But cf. Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious
Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 105–06 (1916) (describing the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior liability for the unauthorized actions of a servant as “novel” and concealing “a
veritable hornets’ nest of stinging difficulties”).
75 An agent can operate on behalf of the principal and can bind the principal by
his or her actions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006).  An agent can act
for the principal even when authority has not been expressly granted, as long as a
third party reasonably believes the agent has the authority. Id. § 2.03.  However,
respondeat superior does not extend to principals’ liability for the actions of agents.
As the Restatement explains:
Agents who are retained as the need arises and who are not otherwise
employees of their principal normally operate their own business enterprises
and are not, except in limited respects, integrated into the principal’s enter-
prise so that a task may be completed or a specified objective accomplished.
Therefore, respondeat superior does not apply.
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tion of this relationship on the notion of control.  The basics of the
control test are straightforward.  A servant is one who is “under the
duty of rendering personal services to the master or to others on
behalf of the master.”76  In addition, the master must have the “right
to control the servant’s work,” which means “being entitled to tell the
servant when to work (within the hours of service) and when not to
work, and what work to do and how to do it.”77  This right of control is
what separates the master-servant relationship from the principal-
agent relationship.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency is perhaps the most widely rec-
ognized source in American law for the principal-agent and master-
servant doctrines.78  Section 220 defines a servant/employee as: “a
person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and
who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other’s control or right to control.”79  As the
commentary acknowledges, however, this relationship is “one not
capable of exact definition.”80  The Restatement provides a ten-factor
test to further determine whether the potential master/employer is
exercising control:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occu-
pation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the local-
ity, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or
by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumen-
talities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
Id. § 2.04 cmt. b.
76 Coase, supra note 12, at 403–04 (quoting FRANCIS RALEIGH BATT, THE LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANT 6 (1929)).
77 Id. at 404.
78 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCS 19 (2004) (“In general,
the single most influential source of legal rules in this area remains the American Law
Institute’s Restatement of Agency.”).
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958).
80 Id. § 220 cmt. c.
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(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.81
Master-servant doctrine makes no exceptions or differentiations
based on the relative status of the “servant” vis-a`-vis the “master.”  It
may seem that high-ranking employees would not meet the test, as
their actions are not controlled in the same way as rank-and-file work-
ers.  However, no such exception exists.  Instead, control “indicates
the closeness of the relation between the one giving and the one
receiving the service rather than the nature of the service or the
importance of the one giving it.”82  Accordingly, “ship captains and
managers of great corporations are normally superior servants, differ-
ing only in the dignity and importance of their positions from those
working under them.”83  The Restatement (Third) of Agency uses the
same example but frames the justification a bit differently:
 In some employment relationships, an employer’s right of control
may be attenuated.  For example, senior corporate officers, like cap-
tains of ships, may exercise great discretion in operating the enter-
prises entrusted to them, just as skilled professionals exercise
discretion in performing their work.  Nonetheless, all employers
retain a right of control, however infrequently exercised.84
The Supreme Court has made the common law “control” test
into the default definition for “employee” whenever used without fur-
ther explanation in a federal statute.  In Community for Creative Non-
81 Id. § 220(2).  These factors have significant overlap with the criteria to deter-
mine “conditions of dependency or subordination” included in a set of International
Labor Organization (ILO) draft recommendations.  Davidov, supra note 19, at 402
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Restatement (Third) of Agency has modernized
the language of these doctrines by changing “servant” to “employee,” but the doc-
trines remain relatively the same. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a)
(2006) (“[A]n employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to con-
trol the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work . . . .”).  The primary
difference in language, beyond the change from servant to employee, is the removal
of “physical” as a modifier for control. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 220 (1958), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006).  The Restate-
ment (Third) of Agency also moves the ten-factor test into the comments section. Id.
§ 7.07 cmt. f.
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. a (1958).
83 Id.
84 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (2006).  The Restatement then
provides the example of a CEO who has bad vision but still wants to drive; the board
can compel the CEO to use a driver when on company business, despite the CEO’s
authority over the company. Id. § 7.07 cmt. f, ex. 15.
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Violence v. Reid,85 the Court said that “[i]n the past, when Congress has
used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that
Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant rela-
tionship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”86  It further
found it appropriate to rely on the general common law of agency,
rather than the doctrine of any particular state, in order to create a
national, uniform law of copyright, and it based its definition on the
Restatement (Second) of Agency’s test.87  The thirteen factors used in Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence to illustrate the common law test largely
come from the Restatement (Second) of Agency’s ten-factor test.88
The factors have been applied in the labor and employment con-
text as well.  The Employee Retirement Security Act’s (ERISA) nomi-
nal definition of “employee” is “any individual employed by an
employer,” without any further direction.89  Following Community for
Creative Non-Violence, the Supreme Court adopted the common law test
and cited to the thirteen-factor test provided in that decision.90  While
acknowledging that “the traditional agency law criteria offer no para-
digm of determinacy[,]” the Court argued that the common law test
“generally turns on factual variables within an employer’s knowledge”
and comports “with our recent precedents and with the common
understanding, reflected in those precedents, of the difference
between an employee and an independent contractor.”91  The Court
rejected the lower court’s definition, which was similar to the “eco-
nomic realities”92 test, because it found that ERISA’s statutory defini-
85 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
86 Id. at 739–40.
87 Id. at 740.
88 Id. at 751–52.  There are differences, however.  The Court did not specifically
cite the Restatement factors regarding whether the potential employee is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business, the context of the occupation, or the parties’ beliefs
as to the relationship.  The Community test does include an additional six factors not
included in the Restatement test:
[T]he location of the work; . . . whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s
discretion over when and how long to work; . . . the hired party’s role in
hiring and paying assistants; . . . the provision of employee benefits; and the
tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
89 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2006); see Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318, 323 (1992) (noting that the ERISA definition of “employee” is “completely circu-
lar and explains nothing”).
90 Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (citing Community, 490 U.S. at 751–52).
91 Id. at 327.
92 See infra note 96.
2013] participation  as  a  theory  of  employment 679
tion was not equally expansive, as it did not include “suffer or permit
to work.”93
The federal employment antidiscrimination statutes—Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—all
share the same definition of employee as ERISA: “an individual
employed by an employer.”94  Up until the Supreme Court’s decision
in Darden, circuit courts had applied different tests to determine
employee status.  Some applied the common law test,95 some the eco-
nomic realities test,96 and some a hybrid test looking at both control
and economic realities.97  After the Court’s holding in Darden, circuit
courts largely saw the writing on the wall and applied the common law
test to antidiscrimination statutes.98  The Supreme Court confirmed
93 Darden, 503 U.S. at 326–27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(f) (2006); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2006); Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2006).
95 See, e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340–41 (11th Cir. 1982)
(“Absent guidance from the Supreme Court, we conclude that the term ‘employee’ in
cases under Title VII is to be construed in light of general common law concepts.”).
96 See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983) (“[O]ne
must examine the economic realities underlying the relationship between the individ-
ual and the so-called principal in an effort to determine whether the individual is
likely to be susceptible to the discriminatory practices which the act was designed to
eliminate.”); see also Patricia Davidson, Comment, The Definition of “Employee” Under
Title VII: Distinguishing Between Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REV.
203, 219–22 (1984) (discussing the Armbruster case at length).
97 See, e.g., Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The third test is
a hybrid which considers the ‘economic realities’ of the work relationship as an
important factor in the calculus, but which focuses more on ‘the extent of the
employer’s right to control the ‘means and manner’ of the worker’s performance
. . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 836, 831 (D.C.
Cir. 1979))).  The hybrid test was arguably “the favored standard for claims under
both Title VII and the ADEA” prior to the Darden decision.  Lewis L. Maltby & David
C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case for Amending Federal Employment Dis-
crimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 250 (1997).
98 See, e.g., Wilde v. Cnty. of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105–06 (8th Cir. 1994)
(“Application of the economic realities test results in Title VII coverage for some com-
mon-law independent contractors because they are vulnerable to discrimination aris-
ing in the course of their work.  Because the economic realities test is based on the
premise that the term should be construed in light of Title VII’s purpose and the
construction is broader than at common law, Darden precludes the test’s applica-
tion.”); see also Maltby & Yamada, supra note 97, at 253 (noting that “[t]he Darden
decision has significantly influenced judicial interpretations under Title VII and
ADEA”). But see Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (adhering to the
hybrid test).  The Frankel court found “that in practice there is little discernible differ-
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this approach in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells,99 which
applied the common law test and cited to Darden.100  Thus, the com-
mon law test has now been ensconced.101  The Court specified that
“[w]e think that the common-law element of control is the principal
guidepost that should be followed in this case.”102  OSHA offers its
statutory protections to “employee[s] of an employer who is employed
in a business of his employer which affects commerce.”103  Given the
similarities between this definition and the definition used in ERISA
and the antidiscrimination statutes, it seems almost indisputable that
the common law agency test should apply.  This has been the adminis-
ence between the hybrid test [which pre-dates and is not adopted in Darden] and the
common law agency test.” Id.
99 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
100 Id. at 444–45, 448.
101 The Clackamas decision was not an effort to distinguish employees from inde-
pendent contractors; rather, it addressed the question of whether a shareholder of a
professional corporation was an employee or instead an employer. Id. at 442.  And
while the Court argued that “the common law’s definition of the master-servant rela-
tionship does provide helpful guidance,” it tacitly acknowledged that the usual factors
to that test were inapplicable. Id. at 448.  Instead, it endorsed the EEOC’s six-factor
test, purportedly based on the common law agency test:
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and
regulations of the individual’s work[;]
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individ-
ual’s work[;]
Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization[;]
Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the
organization[;]
Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as
expressed in written agreements or contracts[; and]
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the
organization.
Id. at 449–50 (quoting EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, COMPLIANCE
MANUAL § 605:0009 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This set of factors is
not exhaustive. Id. at 450, n.10 (“The answer to whether a shareholder-director is an
employee or an employer cannot be decided in every case by a shorthand formula or
magic phrase.” (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Clackamas decision has been criti-
cized for creating a distinction between employees and high-level employee-managers
that does not exist in the common law of agency and need not exist in Title VII. See
Frank J. Menetrez, Employee Status and the Concept of Control in Federal Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 63 SMU L. REV. 137, 182–86 (2010).
102 Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448.
103 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (2006).
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trative conclusion.104  However, at least one court continued to apply
the “economic realities” test post-Darden, finding the analysis to be the
same under both tests.105
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not itself provide
a definition of the term “employee”; instead, the statute simply pro-
vides a laundry list of exclusions.106  The Act did not originally
exclude independent contractors, and both the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and the Supreme Court originally held that so-called
“newsboys” were statutory employees for purposes of the Act, even
though they were considered independent contractors.107  However,
Congress rejected this interpretation of the Act and added indepen-
dent contractors specifically to the list of excluded categories.108  The
Board then adopted the common law right-to-control test in exclud-
ing independent contractors.  The Supreme Court sanctioned this test
in NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America,109 making clear that the
Board had a range of discretion in implementing the test.
104 Opinion Letter from Raymond Donnelly, Dir. of OSHA Office of Gen. Indus.
Enforcement, to Matt Lipson, San Luis Obispo Fire Ass’n (April 2, 1996), available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_id=22132&p_table=
INTERPRETATIONS (citing to Darden and the thirteen-point control test discussed
therein).
105 Loomis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 20 F.3d
938, 942 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Here, the Commission used the economic realities test . . . ,
but determined that the result would be the same under the Darden test.  We agree.”
(citations omitted)).
106 Excluded employees include: agricultural workers, domestically-employed
healthcare or family care employees, public-sector employees, railroad, airline, and
other transportation workers covered by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), independent
contractors, and supervisors.  29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
107 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131–32 (1944).  The Court explic-
itly rejected the common law distinction between employees and independent con-
tractors, holding that the news vendors in question were “subject, as a matter of
economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed to eradicate.” Id. at 127.
108 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); see Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947,
Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136, 137–38 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141–97) (amending the NLRA to exclude independent contractors).
109 390 U.S. 254 (1968).  Noting that “[t]here are innumerable situations which
arise in the common law where it is difficult to say whether a particular individual is
an employee or an independent contractor,” the Court required courts to uphold
reasonable determinations “‘even though [a] court would justifiably have made a dif-
ferent choice had the matter been before it de novo.’”  Id. at 258, 260 (quoting Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)).
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The Board has had occasion to rule on employee status in a vari-
ety of contexts: newspaper carriers,110 nightclub performers,111 gas
station operators,112 and novelty vendors.113  It has taken care to
emphasize that the common law agency test, although often called the
“control” test, has many factors in play beyond control.  Thus, while
control may be important in determining employee status, it is not the
controlling factor.  Instead, the variety of factors listed in Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 220 are to be considered.114  And although it is not
specifically part of the list of factors in § 220, the Board has used the
presence of entrepreneurial opportunities as another factor in evalu-
ating the independence of the workers.115  The Board has rejected the
addition of the FLSA’s “economic dependence” or “economic reali-
ties” test,116 however, despite a recent dissent.117
Despite the doctrinal popularity of the “control” test,118 it
remains something of an enigma.  Courts and commentators continue
110 Compare Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 835, 837 (1978) (finding distrib-
utors to be employees), with Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 303 N.L.R.B. 614, 618
(1991) (finding distributors to be independent contractors).
111 Harrah’s Club v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 471, 480 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding such per-
formers to be independent contractors).
112 Am. Oil Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 438, 440 (1971) (finding operators to be indepen-
dent contractors).
113 ARA Leisure Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 782 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 1986) (uphold-
ing the Board’s conclusion that such workers were employees).
114 The Roadway Package System, Inc. Board stated:
While we recognize that the common-law agency test described by the
Restatement ultimately assesses the amount or degree of control exercised
by an employing entity over an individual, we find insufficient basis for the
proposition that those factors which do not include the concept of “control”
are insignificant when compared to those that do.  Section 220(2) of the
Restatement refers to 10 pertinent factors as “among others,” thereby specifi-
cally permitting the consideration of other relevant factors as well, depend-
ing on the factual circumstances presented. . . .  Thus, the common-law
agency test encompasses a careful examination of all factors and not just
those that involve a right of control.
Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 850 (1998).
115 See, e.g., St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. 474, 480 (considering
entrepreneurial opportunities for newspaper deliverers).
116 Id. at 481–82.
117 Id. at 484 (Liebman, Member, dissenting).
118 Courts have often relied on the federal definition of “employee” for state stat-
utes that mirror and/or supplement federal employment protections. See, e.g.,
Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Califor-
nia courts have interpreted [the California Fair Housing and Employment Act] in
accordance with cases interpreting the [ADEA] and the federal Civil Rights Act . . .
[and therefore] we look to federal cases in those areas that have addressed whether
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to bemoan its inability to deliver clear answers.119  In its initial rejec-
tion of the control test in the context of the NLRA, the Supreme
Court said that “the assumed simplicity and uniformity, resulting from
application of ‘common-law standards,’ does not exist.”120  Perhaps
more fundamentally, there is a concern that the idea of control is not
the proper proxy for the concept of employment.  For some courts
and commentators, “control” is too expansive a term, going beyond
the root notion of supervision that represents the employment rela-
tionship.121  For others, control is no longer critical to employment,
an individual labeled as a partner can be considered an employee for the purpose of
employment discrimination laws.” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)); Lilley v.
BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992) (“ADEA standards governing
employment status also apply to Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Act, Mich. Comp. Laws,
§ 37.2101 et seq.”); Frishberg v. Esprit De Corp., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 793, 798 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (“Since New York law distinguishes between employees and independent con-
tractors in a sufficiently similar manner, the court will use the federal test for both
state and federal claims.”).
119 See, e.g., NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (“There are
innumerable situations which arise in the common law where it is difficult to say
whether a particular individual is an employee or an independent contractor . . . .”);
NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (“Few problems in the law
have given greater variety of application and conflict in results than the cases arising
in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and
what is clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial dealing.”); FedEx Home Delivery
v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“While this seems simple enough, the
Restatement’s non-exhaustive ten-factor test is not especially amenable to any sort of
bright-line rule, a long-recognized rub.” (footnotes omitted)); Kisner v. Jackson, 132
So. 90, 91 (Miss. 1931) (“There have been many attempts to define precisely what is
meant by the term ‘independent contractor’; but the variations in the wording of
these attempts have resulted only in establishing the proposition that it is not possible
within the limitations of language to lay down a concise definition that will furnish
any universal formula, covering all cases.”); Carlson, supra note 11, at 299 (“After
nearly two hundred years of evolution, the multi-factored ‘common law’ test begs the
question of employee status as much as answers it.”).
120 Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. at 122.
121 The D.C. Circuit argued:
Although this “right-to-control” test requires an evaluation of all the circum-
stances surrounding the relationship between the company and the worker,
the extent of the actual supervision exercised by a putative employer over the
means and manner of the workers’ performance is the most important ele-
ment to be considered.  It is important, however, to distinguish such com-
pany supervision from company efforts merely to monitor, evaluate, and
improve the results or ends of the worker’s performance.  Supervision of the
means and manner of the worker’s performance renders him an employee,
while steps taken to monitor, evaluate, and improve the results of his work,
without supervision over the means by and manner in which he does his
work, indicates that the worker is an independent contractor.
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but rather an expression from a bygone era.122  Several other alterna-
tives have arisen from various areas of the law to try to take at least
some share of the control test’s domain.
2. The “Economic Realities” Test
The primary alternative to the control test, particularly in the
realm of employment law, is the “economic realities” or “economic
dependence” test.  It is generally interpreted to provide a more expan-
sive definition to the term “employee,”123 one that covers more vul-
nerable workers who may have some aspects of separation from the
firm but lack true economic independence.  It has its roots in the
interpretation of critical New Deal statutes soon after their passage.124
While clearly rejecting the common law control test, these cases did
not craft a specific and readily cognizable alternative.  Instead, they
looked to the purpose of the statutes and attempted to glean an
approach that harmonized with that purpose.  Interpreting the NLRA,
the Court noted that it was “not necessary in this case to make a com-
pletely definitive limitation around the term ‘employee.’”125  But the
Court did distinguish between the traditional common law definition
and a broader perspective based on the ills at which the statute was
directed.  In other words, the term “employee” was “to be determined
broadly, in doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts rather
than technically and exclusively by previously established legal classifi-
cations.”126  That reference to “economic facts” became “economic
reality” in later cases defining the category of “employee” in the con-
text of the Social Security Act127 and the Fair Labor Standards Act
C.C. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
122 FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 497 (“Gradually, however, a verbal formulation
emerged that sought to identify the essential quantum of independence that sepa-
rates a contractor from an employee, a process . . . where we used words like control
but struggled to articulate exactly what we meant by them. . . . In other words, ‘con-
trol’ was close to what we were trying to capture, but it wasn’t a perfect concurrence.
It was as if the sheet music just didn’t quite match the tune.”).
123 See Bran Noonan, The Campaign Against Employee Misclassification, 82 N.Y. ST.
B.A. J. 42, 46 (2010).
124 Id.
125 Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. at 130.
126 Id. at 129.
127 United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947) (“We concluded that, since that
end was the elimination of labor disputes and industrial strife, ‘employees’ included
workers who were such as a matter of economic reality.” (discussing Hearst Publ’ns,
322 U.S. at 120, 123, 124, 128, 129, 131)).
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(FLSA).128  This test—lacking any factors or even specific doctrinal
definition—was something of a gestalt or eyeball standard, designed
to look at the overall economic relationship and determine whether
Congress intended such a relationship to come under the purview of
the particular statutory scheme.
Although the Court’s “economic reality” definition was over-
turned by statutory amendments to both the NLRA129 and the Social
Security Act,130 it has remained in place with regard to the FLSA.
That statute’s definition of employee is the circular one found in
many statutes: “the term ‘employee’ means any individual employed
by an employer.”131  However, the Act also defines “employ” to
include “suffer or permit to work.”132  Because employ is defined dif-
ferently and more broadly, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the FLSA may extend to cover workers beyond the reach of the com-
mon law agency test.133  The definition of “employee” under the
FMLA incorporates the standard from the FLSA by reference,134 and
thus courts have applied the same “economic realities” test.135
128 Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (“[T]he ‘economic
reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts’ is to be the test of employment.”).
129 Labor-Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136,
137–38 (1947).
130 Social Security Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-642, § 2(a), 62 Stat. 438 (changing
definition of employee to exclude those who “under the usual common-law rules
applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, ha[ve] the status of
an independent contractor”).
131 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2006).
132 Id. § 203(g).
133 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that
the FLSA “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not
qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles”); see also
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (“The test of
employment under the Act is one of ‘economic reality’ . . . .” (citing Goldberg, 366 U.S.
at 33)).
134 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (“The terms ‘employ’, ‘employee’, and ‘State’ have the
same meanings given such terms in subsections (c), (e), and (g) of section 203 of this
title.”).
135 Nichols v. All Points Transp. Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d 621, 630 (E.D. Mich. 2005)
(“Because the statutory definition of FMLA, unlike the definition found in ERISA,
incorporates the FLSA’s broader definition of ‘employee’ and ‘employ,’ the court will
continue to apply the ‘economic realities’ test as described by the Sixth Circuit . . . .”).
According to one survey, however, courts have not applied a consistent test when it
comes to individual liability under the Act. See Sandra F. Sperino, Chaos Theory: The
Unintended Consequences of Expanding Individual Liability Under the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 175, 177 (2005) (finding that courts have uti-
lized at least seven different tests in determining individual liability for owners, execu-
tives, and supervisors).
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Outside of these contexts, however, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that the “control” test is to apply as the default rule.136
According to the “economic realities” test, “employees are those
who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business
to which they render service.”137  Courts have generally looked to a
number of factors in calculating coverage under the “economic reali-
ties” test.  One popular test, developed in Bonnette v. California Health
& Welfare Agency,138 asks whether the employer: “(1) had the power to
hire and fire the employee; (2) supervised and controlled employee
work schedules or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate
and method of payment; and (4) maintained employment
records.”139  Other circuits have more closely mirrored the control
test.140  But in recognition of the FLSA’s broader coverage, courts
have either implicitly or explicitly looked to the “reality” of the
worker’s dependence on the putative employer.141  Such dependence
136 See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
137 Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (interpreting tax provisions).
The Fifth Circuit quoted the Court’s language when interpreting the FLSA. See
Mednick v. Albert Enters., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1975).
138 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
139 Id. at 1470 (citation omitted); see Benjamin F. Burry, Testing Economic Reality:
FLSA and Title VII Protection for Workfare Participants, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 561, 564
(“The Bonnette factors have been utilized by most federal circuits, including the Sec-
ond Circuit.”).
140 See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534–35 (7th Cir. 1987)
(“Among the criteria courts have considered are the following six: 1) the nature and
degree of the alleged employer’s control as to the manner in which the work is to be
performed; 2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending upon
his managerial skill; 3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials
required for his task, or his employment of workers; 4) whether the service rendered
requires a special skill; 5) the degree of permanency and duration of the working
relationship; 6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the
alleged employer’s business.”); Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th
Cir. 2008) (“To aid us in this inquiry, we consider five non-exhaustive factors: (1) the
degree of control exercised by the alleged employer; (2) the extent of the relative
investments of the worker and the alleged employer; (3) the degree to which the
worker’s opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the alleged employer; (4) the
skill and initiative required in performing the job; and (5) the permanency of the
relationship.”).
141 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1538 (describing economic dependence as “the focus of
all the other considerations”); Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 346 (“As a matter of economic
reality, the Sales Leaders were dependent upon Cornerstone to such an extent that
they could not plausibly be considered ‘in business for [themselves].’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299,
303 (5th Cir. 1998))).
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is often manifested through the economic weakness of the workers,
and the focus on economic reality is meant to cut through formalistic
trappings to get at the heart of the relationship.142  In Secretary of Labor
v. Lauritzen,143 for example, the court held that migrant workers on a
pickle farm were employees because they “depend on the
[employer’s] land, crops, agricultural expertise, equipment, and mar-
keting skills.”144
Some commentators have argued that the economic realities test
should replace the control test, because its focus on economic depen-
dence provides more protection to vulnerable workers.145  However,
in the United States the test has thus far remained limited to the FLSA
and FMLA.  The concept of dependency has been more successful in
foreign jurisdictions, which have adopted concepts such as “depen-
dent contractors” and “employee-like” persons in certain worker-pro-
tection regimes.146  In the United Kingdom, for example, several
employment law regimes have expanded to include those working
relationships “whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform
personally any work or services for another party to the contract
whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or cus-
tomer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the
individual.”147  At present, the extended protections include mini-
mum wage requirements, overtime limitations, grievance processes,
142 Mednick, 508 F.2d at 301 (characterizing the ultimate inquiries as: “Is [the
worker] the kind of person meant to be protected by the F.L.S.A.?  Is he dependent
upon finding employment in the business of others . . . , [one of] those who them-
selves are least able in good times to make provisions for their needs when old age
and unemployment may cut off their earnings?” (second alteration in original) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
143 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1529.
144 Id. at 1538.
145 See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT REL., THE DUNLOP
COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 63 (1994), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=
key_workplace (“The definition of employee in labor, employment, and tax law
should be modernized, simplified, and standardized.  Instead of the control test bor-
rowed from the old common law of master and servant, the definition should be
based on the economic realities underlying the relationship between the worker and
the party benefiting from the worker’s services.”).
146 Davidov, supra note 10, at 61 (discussing Canada and Germany).
147 Davidov, supra note 19, at 371 n.54 (quoting Employment Rights Act, 1996,
c. 18, § 230(3)(b) (U.K.); National Minimum Wage Act, 1998, c. 39, § 54(3) (U.K.);
Working Time Regulations, 1998, § 2 (U.K.); Employment Relations Act, 1999, c. 26,
§§ 12(6), 13(1) (U.K); Part-Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment)
Regulations, 2000, § 1 (U.K.) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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and restrictions on wage deductions.148  However, the definition of
“worker” has only extended these protections to an additional set of
laborers; it has not replaced the concept of “employee” in the law.
3. The “Entrepreneurial Opportunities” Test
Despite the Supreme Court’s explicit approval of the common
law agency test in the context of the NLRA, the D.C. Circuit appears
to have adopted a new test based on the “entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties” afforded to workers.  The circuit first adopted this test in Corpo-
rate Express Delivery Systems v. NLRB,149 in which it held that the
determination of employee status should “focus not upon the
employer’s control of the means and manner of the work but instead
upon whether the putative independent contractors have a significant
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.”150  The court justified
the shift on the following grounds:
[T]he latter factor better captures the distinction between an
employee and an independent contractor.  For example, as the
Board points out, “the full-time cook is regarded as a servant [rather
than as an independent contractor] although it is understood that
the employer will exercise no control over the cooking.”  Similarly,
a corporate executive is an employee despite enjoying substantial
control over the manner in which he does his job.  Conversely, a
lawn-care provider who periodically services each of several sites is
an independent contractor regardless how closely his clients super-
vise and control his work.  The full-time cook and the executive are
employees and the lawn-care provider is an independent contractor
not because of the degree of supervision under which each labors
but because of the degree to which each functions as an entrepre-
neur—that is, takes economic risk and has the corresponding
opportunity to profit from working smarter, not just harder.151
In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB,152 the circuit confirmed this new
“entrepreneurial opportunities” test as the proper standard for evalu-
ating employee status.  The majority retained the common law agency
test as the proper standard, but argued that entrepreneurial opportu-
nity was “an important animating principle by which to evaluate [the
common law agency] factors.”153  The court explicitly rejected control
148 See Davidov, supra note 19, at 371.
149 292 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
150 Id. at 780 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 202(1) cmt. d (1958)).
152 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
153 Id. at 497.
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as the primary factor, citing its indefiniteness as well as its failure to
capture the essence of employee status.154  The dissent found that the
majority’s “entrepreneurial opportunities” test failed to follow the
Supreme Court-approved common law test,155 a contention supported
by other commentators.156
4. The “Entrepreneurial Control” Test
The Restatement (Third) of Employment Law has adopted a variation
of the “entrepreneurial opportunities” test by defining “employee” as
one who works in the interests of the employer when “the employer’s
relationship with the individual effectively prevents the individual
from rendering the services as part of an independent business.”157
The Restatement further refines this as follows: “An individual renders
services as part of an independent business when the individual in his
or her own interest exercises entrepreneurial control over the manner
and means by which the services are performed.”158  The Restatement
commentary agrees with the FedEx court that the common law right-
to-control test “looks not only to the principal’s control of the physical
details of how the service provider performs the work but also to other
factors relevant to whether the service provider has entrepreneurial
control over the manner and means by which the services are per-
formed.”159  Thus, while both the D.C. Circuit and the Restatement
focus on entrepreneurialism, the court’s “entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties” test focuses on whether employees have a legal right to pursue
154 Id. (“It was as if the sheet music just didn’t quite match the tune.”).
155 Id. at 510 (Garland, J., dissenting in part).
156 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
353, 357 (2011) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s new test “directly contradicts
Supreme Court precedent”).
157 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 1.01(1) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2009), available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/Employment%20Law%20TD%20No
%202%20-%20Revised%20-%20September%202009.pdf.  The full definition is:
Unless otherwise provided by law or by § 1.02 or § 1.03, an individual ren-
ders services as an employee of an employer if (a) the individual acts, at least
in part, to serve the interests of the employer, (b) the employer consents to
receive the individual’s services, and (c) the employer’s relationship with the
individual effectively prevents the individual from rendering the services as
part of an independent business.
Id.
158 Id. § 1.01(2).  Entrepreneurial control is further defined as “control over
important business decisions, including whether to hire and where to assign assist-
ants, whether to purchase and where to deploy equipment, and whether and when to
service other customers.” Id. § 1.01(3).
159 Id. § 1.01 cmt. a.
690 notre dame law review [vol. 89:2
economic gain outside of the relationship.  The Restatement’s test, on
the other hand, looks at the degree of entrepreneurial control exer-
cised by the parties within the relationship.160
5. The Purpose Test
Finally, one definition of employment has sought to look past the
category itself and instead focus on the underlying purpose of the stat-
utory or common law scheme at issue.  As one commentator has
asked: “[W]hy should employee status matter at all?”161  Instead of
creating a category of “employee” that applies in a variety of different
situations, critics contend that courts, regulators, and legislators
should focus on the particular purpose of a particular legal regime
and should tailor coverage to meet that purpose.  In discussing the
statutory definition of employee within the FLSA, Judge Easterbrook
argued that the statutory purposes of that statute were quite different
from the common law concerns at issue in the control test.162  Instead
of having a uniform definition across legal regimes, it would be more
appropriate, argued the judge, to develop definitions based on the
functions of the particular law.
Although the functional approach has intuitive appeal, it has not
gained a foothold in the law.  In its initial interpretations of
“employee” under the New Deal statutes, the Supreme Court began by
using the functional approach.163  However, Congress soon moved to
amend both the NLRA and the Social Security Act to reinstate the
160 As the Restatement frames it: “Employees do not provide their services as an
independent business.” Id.; see id. § 1.01 cmt. d (“The key question is whether a ser-
vice provider functions as an independent business while performing services on the
principal’s behalf.”).
161 Carlson, supra note 11, at 299.
162 See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543–45 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easter-
brook, J., concurring).  Judge Easterbrook described the three purposes of the FLSA
as preventing workers from working abnormally long hours, spreading work and
thereby reducing unemployment, and protecting the overtime workers from them-
selves. Id.  In contrast, he described the purpose of vicarious liability as creating
proper incentives to take care against harm and to potentially spread the risk of loss.
Id.  He argued: “The reasons for blocking vicarious liability at a particular point have
nothing to do with the functions of the FLSA.” Id. at 1544.
163 See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 711–12 (1947) (“The very specificity of
the exemptions, however, and the generality of the employment definitions indicates
that the terms ‘employment’ and ‘employee,’ are to be construed to accomplish the
purposes of the legislation.” (footnote omitted)), abrogation recognized by Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S.
111, 124 (1944) (stating that the definition of “employee” under the NLRA “‘must be
read in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained’” (quoting S.
Chi. Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 259 (1940))).
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common law control test.164  The deeper theoretical problem for the
functional or purpose test is its abandonment of any common notion
of employment.  If certain regimes are based on the notion of
“employee” to determine the extent of coverage, then arguably the
concept of employment is part of the overall system of regulation.
The purpose-oriented approach seeks to deny, to a greater or lesser
extent, the theoretical basis for this commonality.  And yet the con-
cept of employment retains rhetorical and policy force.  Indeed, even
proponents of the function or purpose test concede that Congress has
continually gone back to the “employee” category to shape the con-
tours for various areas of the law.165  Accordingly, the biggest problem
for a truly purpose-oriented theory of employment is that it has no
theory of employment at all.
One variation on the purpose test is to construct a hybrid version
in which a core notion of employment is matched with various addi-
tions to the definition depending on the context.166  The United
States has a limited version of this approach, as the common law defi-
nition is widely used, but the FLSA and FMLA expand to protect a
wider range of workers based on the notion of dependency.  But even
such flexible approaches need a core vision of employment to provide
consistency amidst the permutations.  As such, it relies on the notion
of employment to provide a category, even if some variations on that
category are permitted in individualized instances.167
164 Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)); Social Security Act of 1948, Pub.
L. No. 80-642, § 2(a), 62 Stat. 438 (changing definition of employee to exclude those
who “under the usual common-law rules applicable in determining the employer-
employee relationship, has the status of independent contractor”).
165 See Carlson, supra note 11, at 300 (“The courts, of course, cannot abandon
employee status as a test as long as Congress and state legislatures continue to make
employee status the clearly stated basis of statutory coverage.”).
166 See, e.g., Guy Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: ‘Employee’
as a Viable (Though Over-used) Legal Concept, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR
LAW 133, 151 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2006) (“An appropriate balance is
to separate protective labour and employment regulations from other areas of law in
which the concept of employee is used, such as tort law and taxation; and maintain a
unified definition of ‘employee’ for protective labour and employment regulations,
based on their common goals, while allowing room for extensions or exceptions in
particular instances.”).
167 See id. (“While I wholeheartedly share the view that the concept of employee
should be interpreted purposively, and that the concept can have different meanings
in different contexts, dismantling the concept altogether takes this approach too far.”
(footnote omitted)).
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B. Defining “Scope of Employment”
Unlike the competing definitions for the term “employee,” the
term “scope of employment” has not been the subject of various theo-
retical approaches.  The term is not generally used in labor and
employment statutes, as in most cases the nature of the rights pro-
vided to employees guarantees that those rights concern activities
within the scope of employment.168  The one primary exception is
workers’ compensation, which only provides protections against inju-
ries incurred within the scope of employment.169  Outside of labor
and employment law, employers are only liable for the torts and
crimes of their employees in such actions as are taken within the
scope of employment.170  And intellectual property protections gener-
ally only apply to works made within the scope of employment.171
Scope of employment is defined as that zone of conduct in which
the employee is performing her job duties.172  Efforts to define
168 For example, the NLRA concerns the rights of employees to bargain with their
employer, 20 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act specifically
addresses discrimination in the context of employment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2006);
ERISA involves pension and healthcare rights within the employment relationship, 29
U.S.C. § 1001 (2006); and FLSA involves mandatory terms within the employment
relationship, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).  Once it is established that the party is an
employee and that the firm is the employer, there is no need to further establish that
the actions in question took place within the scope of employment—they do by the
very nature of the statutory protections.
169 See Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 918
(1980) (“To qualify for workers’ compensation, the employee must suffer a personal
injury ‘by accident’ ‘arising out of and in the course of employment.’” (citation
omitted)).
170 See supra Sections I.B–C.
171 See supra Section I.D.
172 See, e.g., McGrail v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 67 P.2d 851, 853 (1937) (“The test
for determining whether an employee is, at a given time, in the course of his employ-
ment, is whether the employee was, at the time, engaged in the performance of the
duties required of him by his contract of employment or by the specific direction of
his employer, or, as sometimes stated, whether he was engaged at the time in the
furtherance of the employer’s interests.”).
The doctrinal definition for “scope of employment” can be quite detailed.  For
example, the Restatement (Second) of Agency has two provisions devoted to defining
scope of employment, both with lengthy lists of factors. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 228(1) (1958) (defining conduct as within the scope of employment “if,
but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially
within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant
against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master”); id. § 229(2)
(“In determining whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is neverthe-
less so similar to or incidental to the conduct authorized as to be within the scope of
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employees’ duties as excluding all torts, statutory violations, or crimi-
nal activity have generally been unavailing.173  Under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, if the employee is on the job or within a zone of
activity related to the employment duties, the employer will generally
be liable for the employee’s tort, regardless of the employer’s efforts
to define such conduct as outside of the employee’s duties or author-
ity.  Instead, courts have adopted something along the lines of a fore-
seeability test, in which the employer is liable if the employee’s actions
are in some way foreseeable.  In two famous cases involving drunken
sailors, both Judge Hand and Judge Friendly found employers liable
for acts of violence to person and property taken by intoxicated
employees.174  In both cases, however, the courts found that the
actions were taken within the sailors’ overall context of employment
and that therefore the employer was liable.175  Moreover, an employer
may be liable for employee actions taken outside of the scope of
employment if the master retains some level of responsibility
(through intent, recklessness, or non-delegable duty) or if the
employee was aided in some way by apparent authority or the agency
relationship itself.176  Given “the proclivity of seamen to find solace
employment, the following matters of fact are to be considered: (a) whether or not
the act is one commonly done by such servants; (b) the time, place and purpose of
the act; (c) the previous relations between the master and the servant; (d) the extent
to which the business of the master is apportioned between different servants; (e)
whether or not the act is outside the enterprise of the master or, if within the enter-
prise, has not been entrusted to any servant; (f) whether or not the master has reason
to expect that such an act will be done; (g) the similarity in quality of the act done to
the act authorized; (h) whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm is done
has been furnished by the master to the servant; (i) the extent of departure from the
normal method of accomplishing an authorized result; and (j) whether or not the act
is seriously criminal”).  However, these factors are in service to an overriding princi-
ple: namely, whether the employee was acting as an employee or in her personal
capacity.
173 See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 800–03 (1998) (rejecting
the notion that supervisor sexual harassment takes place outside of the scope of
employment because it is against company policy or motivated by personal desires).
But see Rochelle Rubin Weber, Note, “Scope of Employment” Redefined: Holding Employers
Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by Their Employees, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1513,
1520–22 nn.33–34 (1992) (collecting non-Title VII cases in which sexual assaults are
determined to fall outside the scope of employment).
174 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J.); Nelson v. Am.-West African Line, 86 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.).
175 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 398 F.2d at 172; Nelson, 86 F.2d at 732.
176 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958) (“A master is not subject to
liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment,
unless: (a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or (b) the master
was negligent or reckless, or (c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the
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for solitude by copious resort to the bottle while ashore,” their acts of
violence—while regrettable and unauthorized—were sufficiently fore-
seeable to be part of the costs of doing such business.177
As a result, “scope of employment” categorization questions have
usually concerned not whether the particular employee is following
the script of her particular contractual relationship with the employer,
but rather whether the activity is part and parcel of the overall
employment relationship.178  The employer is expected to absorb the
costs of doing business as a firm, which includes a certain level of
employee activity that may not directly inure to the employer’s bene-
fit.  As the Restatement (Second) of Agency put it, the “ultimate question”
in determining the scope of employment is “whether or not it is just
that the loss resulting from the servant’s acts should be considered as
one of the normal risks to be borne by the business in which the ser-
vant is employed.”179  Or, as then-Judge Cardozo put it,
The risks of injury incurred in the crowded contacts of the factory
through the acts of fellow workmen are not measured by the ten-
dency of such acts to serve the master’s business.  Many things that
have no such tendency are done by workmen every day. . . .  The test
of liability is the relation of the service to the injury, of the employ-
ment to the risk.180
master, or (d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort
by the existence of the agency relation.”).
177 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 398 F.2d at 172.  The Restatement (Second) of Agency has a
complex set of interrelated provisions attempting to define scope of employment.
Along with a ten-factor test for determining whether certain kinds of unauthorized
acts may fall within the scope of employment, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 229(2) (1958), the Restatement has separate provisions on criminal or tortious con-
duct, id. § 231, failures to act, id. § 232, conduct not for the purpose of serving the
master, id. § 235, and instrumentalities of employment used outside of the relation-
ship, id. § 238.  Another instance along this boundary is whether the employer is lia-
ble to an unauthorized passenger. See Rahman v. State, 246 P.3d 182, 189 (Wash.
2011) (finding employer liable for injury to unauthorized passenger), superseded by
statute, 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 82, 754–55 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.92.180 (West 2011)) (absolving employer of liability for unauthorized passenger).
178 See Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 609 (1988)
(“The scope of employment limitation upon respondeat superior liability may be
understood in many instances as a way to limit the employer’s liability to torts that are
‘caused’ by the business enterprise.”).
179 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a (1958).
180 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711, 712 (N.Y. 1920).
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III. EMPLOYEES AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM
Although we think of employees as defined by their work or
labor, the legal definitions of “employee” have much more to do with
the relationship between the individual worker and the person or
entity for whom she works.  Employment is not simply labor; it is labor
within a particular context.  In the modern economy, employees
always work within the context of an economic firm.  In fact, it is my
contention that the firm itself creates the employment relationship.
This Part examines how the theory of the firm in economic and orga-
nizational literature has focused on the employment relationship, and
how being an “employee” really means providing one’s labor within
the context of a firm.
Employees have been central to our conception of the firm from
the start.  In early neoclassical economics, the theory of firm was quite
rudimentary; it simply saw the firm as a black box which took in inputs
and produced outputs.  No further dissection was undertaken.  How-
ever, this theory did differentiate between what was inside the firm
and what was outside: employees and capital assets were inside, while
customers and suppliers were outside.181  Although this conception of
the firm was useful in early economic modeling and retains that pur-
pose even today, it was ripe for a reinvestigation that endeavored to
give it substance.
Ronald Coase kicked off the exploration of the internal workings
and purpose of the firm in The Nature of the Firm.182  In an oft-quoted
passage, Coase framed the issue this way:
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-
ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market.
Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place
of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is
substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production.
It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating pro-
duction.  Yet, having regard to the fact that if production is regu-
lated by price movements, production could be carried on without
any organisation at all, well we might ask, why is there any
organisation?183
Coase’s answer was that the price mechanism can be costly.184  For
certain transactions, it is cheaper to simply direct the production to
181 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms,
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1631 (2001).
182 Coase, supra note 12.
183 Id. at 388 (footnote omitted).
184 Id. at 390–92.
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occur rather than contracting separately for it.  In order to avoid the
transaction costs of contracting, such transactions will occur within a
firm rather than on an open market.185
Of course, the firm-based transactions described by Coase involve
the purchase of labor for a particular endeavor.  In explaining these
transactions, Coase stated: “If a workman moves from department Y to
department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices,
but because he is ordered to do so.”186  The relationship between the
entrepreneur-coordinator and the employee is the primary distinction
between the firm and the market.  It is the reason for the firm’s exis-
tence.  Coase seemed to be arguing that firms would be unnecessary
but for the need to remove the employment relationship from the
vagaries of market transactions.
This conclusion is cemented when Coase considered “whether
the concept of a firm which has been developed fits in with that
existing in the real world.”187  His answer? “We can best approach the
question of what constitutes a firm in practice by considering the legal
relationship normally called that of ‘master and servant’ or ‘employer
and employee.’”188  He then quoted at length from a treatise concern-
ing the common law “control” test, which provided that “ ‘[t]he
master must have the right to control the servant’s work, either per-
sonally or by another servant or agent.’”189  Coase concluded: “We
thus see that it is the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal
concept of ‘employer and employee,’ just as it was in the economic
concept which was developed above.”190  For Coase, the firm was
defined by the employer-employee relationship.191
In an important response to Coase’s work, Armen Alchian and
Harold Demsetz also focused on the relationship of employees with
other participants within the structure of the firm.192  However, they
185 Id.
186 Id. at 387.
187 Id. at 403.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 404 (quoting FRANCES RALEIGH BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 6
(1933)).
190 Id.
191 See Orts, supra note 18, at 296–97.
192 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 17, at 777 (“When a lumber mill employs a
cabinetmaker, cooperation between specialists is achieved within a firm, and when a
cabinetmaker purchases wood from a lumberman, the cooperation takes place across
markets (or between firms).”).
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argued that Coase’s focus on control, authority, and direction was mis-
leading.193  Instead, they framed their argument in these terms:
Telling an employee to type this letter rather than to file that docu-
ment is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather
than that brand of bread.  I have no contract to continue to
purchase from the grocer and neither the employer nor the
employee is bound by any contractual obligations to continue their
relationship.  Long-term contracts between employer and employee
are not the essence of the organization we call a firm.194
Alchian and Demsetz’s critique of Coase’s theory does not mean that
employees are no longer central to the idea of the firm.  Instead, they
argue that the importance of the firm (as separate from the market)
stems from the need to coordinate production in the midst of a vari-
ety of inputs.  The need for a system of team production is what sepa-
rates firms from markets.195  Alchian and Demsetz defined team
production as “production in which 1) several types of resources are
used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each
cooperating resource.”196  As a result, team production is used when
the coordinated effort increases productivity, after factoring out the
costs associated with monitoring and disciplining the team.197
Although Alchian and Demsetz did not endorse Coase’s model of
the firm, their model also revolves around the role of the employee
within the firm.  The primary concern of the team production model
is making sure that the team members do not shirk their responsibili-
ties to the team.  The inability to measure individual contributions to
productivity is what makes the firm an efficient alternative to markets,
but it is also the firm’s central governance problem.  Alchian and
Demsetz argued that a specialized, independent monitor may be the
best way of insuring that the team members all contribute appropri-
ately and are rewarded appropriately.198  That central monitor—the
recipient of the residual profits—would be the firm.  Although Coase
as well as Alchian and Demsetz personified this monitor in the role of
an entrepreneur-coordinator, such a collapse of powers into one
human being is only possible in the smallest of firms.  In order to
193 Id. (“To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a
deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in renegotiation of
contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties.”).
194 Id.
195 Id. at 777–78.
196 Id. at 779.
197 Id. at 780.
198 Id. at 782–83.
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meet the criteria set down by the model,199 the central component of
team production is the firm itself: a “person” who contracts for all
other team inputs.
It could be argued that Alchian and Demsetz conceived of a firm
detached from employees, since the Alchian-Demsetz monitor must
be outside the production process while being able to negotiate with
all team members for their input and compensation.  However, unless
the “firm” is a sole proprietor, that monitor is merely a mechanism for
providing coordination of inputs.  And employees are the primary
source of the inputs.200  Thus, the Alchian-Demsetz team production
model does not exclude employees from the definition of the firm.
Although their model, with its focus on “inputs,” broadens the scope
of the firm to include investors as well as employees, the purpose of
the Alchian-Demsetz firm remains the management of employees
through the coordination of team production.
As theorists moved beyond these foundational works and into
empirical research, the identification of transaction costs, monitoring
costs, and team production have remained central concepts.  Using
the transaction-costs model, Oliver Williamson and others have identi-
fied the types of contractual difficulties that are likely to lead to firm
governance, rather than market solutions.201  In situations where con-
tributions and compensation can be harder to define, the parties will
199 Alchian and Demsetz set forth the following characteristics of the firm: “(a)
joint input production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party who is common to all
the contracts of the joint inputs, (d) who has rights to renegotiate any input’s con-
tract independently of contracts with other input owners, (e) who holds the residual
claim, and (f) who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status.” Id. at
783.
200 Alchian and Demsetz seem to believe that the firm will be represented by a
central figure who has claim to the entire residual, and thus an interest in coordinat-
ing the firm most efficiently.  But they say nothing about who can appoint such a
central figure, and they express skepticism about the ability of shareholders to per-
form the monitoring function.  Rather than characterize shareholders as owners, they
argue that shareholders should be viewed merely as investors, like bondholders, albeit
“more optimistic” ones.  They ask:
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship is one ema-
nating from the division of ownership among several people, or is it that the
collection of investment funds from people of varying anticipations is the
underlying factor?  If the latter, why should any of them be thought of as the
owners in whom voting rights, whatever they may signify or however exercis-
able, should reside in order to enhance efficiency?  Why voting rights in any
of the outside, participating investors?
Id. at 789 n.14.
201 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985)
(discussing transaction costs economics); Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman,
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be left with incomplete contracts that require a governance structure
to prevent opportunism.  This opportunism will be particularly prob-
lematic where one or both of the parties must invest significant
resources in assets specific to the particular firm, project, or transac-
tion.  This asset specificity makes the parties susceptible to hold-ups
from their contractual partners in the absence of a system of govern-
ance.  Firms can be useful in providing the structures that deter
opportunism.202
The focus on assets has carried over into the “property rights”
theory of the firm.  This theory, developed in a series of articles by
Grossman, Hart, and Moore, argues that firms are necessary as a
repository of property rights for assets used in joint production.203  By
owning the property outright, the firm prevents the problem of the
commons (in which no one holds property rights over valuable assets)
as well as the problem of the anticommons (in which property rights
are divvied up amongst too many disparate actors).  The Grossman-
Hart-Moore model dictates that the firm should be owned by those
who contribute the most valuable and most asset-specific property to
the joint enterprise.  They are not only most necessary to the firm’s
success; they are also the most vulnerable to hold-up problems as the
joint enterprise moves forward in time.
These theories have not focused on the role of the employee in
the firm, instead focusing on contracts and property rights.  But the
role of the employee in these models still remains critical.  Although
the property rights discussed in the model are generally nonhuman
assets, the assets are “the glue that keeps the firm together”204 and
thus keep employees within the firm.  Hart poses the following hypo-
thetical: if firm 1 acquires firm 2, what is to stop workers at former
firm 2 from quitting and forming a new entity?
For firm 1’s acquisition of firm 2 to make any economic sense, there
must be some source of firm 2 value over and above the workers’
human capital, i.e. some ‘glue’ holding firm 2’s workers in place.
This source of value may consist of as little as a place to meet; the
Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences, 10
BUS. & POL. 1 (2008) (discussing the transaction costs approach).
202 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 201, at 114–15; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHA-
NISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47–48 (1996).
203 See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); San-
ford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart &
John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
204 HART, supra note 203, at 57.
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firm’s name, reputation, or distribution network; the firm’s files,
containing important information about its operations or its cus-
tomers; or a contract that prohibits firm 2’s workers from working
for competitors or from taking existing clients with them when they
quit. . . .  [W]ithout something holding the firm together, the firm
is just a phantom.205
Thus, the property-rights theory of the firm is designed in part to
explain why the firm’s employees remain within the firm.206
In the transaction costs model, employees’ contributions must be
recognized as assets of both the firm and the employee—often
described as “human capital.”  Some types of human capital are trans-
ferable, such as education or general skills, but other types are specific
to the firm and generally worthless outside it.  To the extent an
employee has invested in firm-specific skills, she is subject to opportu-
nistic behavior by the firm, since she cannot credibly threaten to
depart and take those skills to a different firm.  In the transaction-cost
model, employees may be precisely the vulnerable yet valuable con-
tributors to the joint enterprise who are most vulnerable to opportu-
nistic behavior.207
Along these lines, Rajan and Zingales have proposed an “access”
model of power within the firm.208  The model defines a firm “both in
terms of unique assets (which may be physical or human) and in
terms of the people who have access to these assets.”209  Access to the
unique assets is what defines the power of the individuals within and
outside of the firm.  Rajan and Zingales define access as “the ability to
use, or work with, a critical resource.”210  Examples of critical
resources include machines, ideas, and people.211  As Rajan and Zin-
gales make clear, “The agent who is given privileged access to the
205 Id. (footnotes omitted).
206 But cf. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113
Q.J. ECON. 387, 388 (1998) (“The property rights view does not consider employees
part of the firm because, given that employees cannot be owned, there is no sense in
which they are any different from agents who contract with the firm at arm’s
length.”).
207 Indeed, Margaret Blair offers the following critique: “The tendency in the
transactions cost literature has been to recognize that firm-specific human capital
raises similar questions, but then to sidestep the implications of these questions for
corporate governance.”  Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of
the Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 66 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark
J. Roe eds., 2000).
208 Rajan & Zingales, supra note 206.
209 Id. at 390.
210 Id. at 388.
211 Id.
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resource gets no new residual rights of control.  All she gets is the
opportunity to specialize her human capital to the resource and make
herself valuable.”212  Combined with her right to leave the firm, access
gives the employee the ability “to create a critical resource that she
controls: her specialized human capital.”213  Control over this critical
resource is a source of power.  Rajan and Zingales argue that “[s]ince
the amount of surplus that she gets from this power is often more
contingent on her making the right specific investment than the sur-
plus that comes from ownership, access can be a better mechanism to
provide incentives than ownership.”214  Given the importance of
access, the role of the firm is to allocate access efficiently amongst the
firm’s agents.215
Recent scholarship has taken the role of human capital even fur-
ther.  One aspect of this capital—knowledge—has served as the basis
for a new set of approaches to the firm.216  Knowledge is defined both
as explicit sets of formal information as well as the ability to apply a
repository of unspecified information in developing an answer or
approach to a particular problem.217  As one set of knowledge-based
theorists explains, “The way a firm develops the knowledge it will use
in its production process and the extent that the firm can bind this
knowledge to its structure will influence its organizational struc-
ture.”218  Rather than emphasize the ownership of physical assets,
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 391.
216 See generally E´rica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institu-
tions, and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
1123 (2007) (arguing that an organization’s structure is dependent on the type of
knowledge it requires); Sarah Kaplan et al., Knowledge-Based Theories of the Firm: A
Review and Extension, (Mass. Inst. Tech. Sloan Working Paper No. 4216-01, 2001)
(introducing a view of the firm that is knowledge-based), available at http://citeseerx
.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.8.8829&rep=rep1&type=pdf; Katherine
V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the
Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (discussing legal conceptions that
govern the ownership of human capital within the workplace).
217 For a discussion of explicit versus tacit knowledge, see Ikujiro Nonaka et al., A
Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation: Understanding the Dynamic Process of Creating
Knowledge, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING & KNOWLEDGE 491, 494 (Mei-
nolf Dierkes et al. eds., 2001).  Gorga and Halberstam classify knowledge into three
types: “knowledge embedded in physical assets,” “knowledge embedded in the organi-
zational structure or the group of individuals that constitute the firm[,]” and “special-
ized knowledge embedded in the individual.”  Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 216,
at 1141–42.
218 Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 216, at 1140.
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which can be fungible and nonspecific, the knowledge-based theory
focuses on the need to produce, distribute, and ultimately retain valu-
able knowledge-based assets within the firm.219  Choices between cen-
tralized and multi-divisional organizational structures,220 or between
covenants not to compete and employee stock options,221 are based
on the management of knowledge within the firm.  Along the same
lines, a capability-based theory of the firm focuses on firm-specific
knowledge and learning that can be translated into joint produc-
tion.222  This theory also emphasizes the role of employees as holders
of the firm’s capabilities.223
Knowledge-based theories of the firm serve as something of a
bridge between the economic, organizational, and sociological theo-
ries as to the nature of the firm.224  Management historians such as
Alfred Chandler have long considered the actual roles of employees
within the firm to be the centerpiece of firm dynamics.225  Organiza-
tional theory has built upon these insights and carried them over to
today’s firms, which generally offer flatter hierarchical structures and
more work in teams.  In fact, one set of scholars examined the role of
the firm as a “collaborative community” in which employees work
together toward common goals.226  Such a firm must have a shared
ethos of contribution to a collective purpose and the success of
others;227 it must be structured so as to allow for flexible organiza-
219 Id. at 1137 (criticizing the property rights theory for failing to account for the
importance of employees as assets).
220 Id. at 1173–83.
221 Id. at 1183–92; cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Bounda-
ries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1686–88 (2009) (discussing
the role of covenants not to compete in managing innovation within the firm).
222 See Thomas McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production and Work
Practices for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 135,
137–38.
223 Id. at 139.
224 See, e.g., Rajan & Zingales, supra note 206, at 424–25 (arguing that there is
“ample opportunity for gains from trade” between economics and sociology, as soci-
ologists have studied the role of power within organizations “in some detail”); D.
Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1
(2009) (comparing organizational theories to the traditional legal and economic the-
ories of contract and firm).
225 See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND 1–12 (1977) (discussing
the role of middle- and upper-management in coordinating large firms and their
employees).
226 See Paul S. Adler & Charles Heckscher, Towards Collaborative Community, in THE
FIRM AS COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY 11, 20 (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds.,
2006).
227 Id. at 39–43.
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tional boundaries but highly specialized knowledge;228 it must base
status on knowledge and expertise, rather than hierarchy;229 and it
must create an identity of independence and personal consistency.230
Such collaborative-community firms are contrasted with hierarchical
firms, which manage employees with a traditional command-and-con-
trol structure,231 as well as market-based firms, which break down
traditional firm barriers through outsourcing and contingent work-
ers.232  This vision of the future of the firm seeks to develop the opti-
mal approach to the relationship between a firm and its employees.
Indeed, the driving consideration seems to be managing employees in
a knowledge-based economy in the most efficient and productive way
possible.233
There are theories of the firm, such as the “nexus of contracts”
approach, that do not single out employees for special primacy of
place.234  On the whole, however, approaches to the nature of the
228 Id. at 44.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 54–59.
231 Id. at 64–65 (discussing the Wal-Mart approach).
232 Id.
233 See, e.g., id. at 74 (“One major danger [to our economic future] is the harden-
ing of the current dualistic structures: strong mechanisms of collaboration and com-
munity for high-end ‘knowledge workers’ alongside coercive hierarchical and market
control over the lower tier of the workforce.”).
234 Tellingly, perhaps, the theory of the firm which has had the most purchase on
corporate law cares least about the role of employees within the firm.  The “nexus of
contracts” theory argues that the firm is merely a central hub for a series of contrac-
tual relationships. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310
(1976).  Jensen and Meckling emphasize that the firm is a “legal fiction[ ];” it is “not an
individual” and has no real independent existence. Id. at 310–11. Although Jensen
and Meckling’s model focuses on agency costs, it largely ignores employees as a
whole.  The agents in question are the upper-level managers who are tasked to do the
bidding of principals.  Their theory defines agency costs as the costs associated with
“the monitoring expenditures by the principal,” “bonding expenditures by the agent,”
and “the residual loss.” Id. at 308.  The monitoring they describe does look a lot like
the “control” that Coase focused on as the key element in defining the firm.  How-
ever, Jensen and Meckling turn their attention to the relationship between sharehold-
ers (principals) and management (agents), rather than the relationship of employees
to the firm. Id. at 310.  Their model seeks to describe the finance structure of the
firm in conjunction with the management structure of corporate governance.  The
nexus of contract theory is thus not really a theory of the firm at all, but rather a
theory of agency costs within a certain type of firm. See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An Econo-
mist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1759 (1989) (“Princi-
pal-agent theory . . . fails to answer the vital questions of what defines a firm and
where the boundaries of its structure are located.”); McInerney, supra note 222, at
137–38 (“Scholars working in this paradigm do not offer theories of the firm so much
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firm within a market economy have developed the role of employees
and employment within the firm, as opposed to “independent” con-
tracting parties outside of the firm.  This insight has been recognized
from Coase up through the knowledge-based theories of the present.
As such, theories of the firm can serve as an intellectual foundation
for the concept of “employee” and “employment” within the law.  The
following Part is an initial effort at building this foundation.
IV. EMPLOYMENT AS PARTICIPATION IN A FIRM
A. Participation as Theory
Coase recognized that in looking for the theory of the firm out in
the real world, one should look not at the law of entities, but rather
the law of employment.235  Although business organizations are the
“firms” considered in Coase’s musings, business organizations them-
selves did not represent the natural boundaries of a firm for econom-
ics purposes.  Rather, firms were represented by the relationship
between the legal entity and its employees.236  The relationship
between employer and employee was the nonmarket interaction that
justified the creation of the firm in the first place.237
The weakness in Coase’s analysis, however, was his overemphasis
on the concept of “control” within the firm.  Yes, an employee can be
directed to work on one task rather than another, and an employer
can dictate the details of that work in a very close manner.  But the
nature of the supervision need not be significantly different than the
close oversight a general contractor provides to a subcontractor.
Moreover, given that most employment contracts are at-will, both the
employer and the employee are free to walk away from the relation-
ship at any time.238  Employees cannot be controlled, at least over any
duration, if they are free to walk away at any time.  A business with a
supplier under a long-term contract has more extensive legal control
than an employer does over an at-will employee.
And so it is with the “control” test used in the common law defini-
tion of employment.  The concept of “control” seems to overstate the
power exercised by the employer within the relationship, at least with
as theories of who controls the firm.”); Rock & Wachter, supra note 181, at 1624
(“Jensen and Meckling, despite the title, did not really offer a full-fledged theory of
the firm.  Rather, they offered a theory of agency costs within firms . . . .”).
235 Coase, supra note 12, at 388 (discussing the firm in the context of employer-
employee relationships).
236 Id. at 403.
237 Id. at 393.
238 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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respect to supervision.  An employee can be given a relative degree of
freedom on the job but still be considered an employee, while an
independent contractor can be given exacting specifications and still
be outside the firm.  Even the Restatement (Second) of Agency recognizes
that the degree of actual supervisory control is a poor proxy for
employment.239  Moreover, the issue of “control” implies that those
employees with more power within the organization are less like other
employees, as they are less controlled than they are controlling.  How-
ever, when it comes to traditional agency doctrine, the power of the
employee within the organization is irrelevant to their status as an
employee.  As the Restatement confirms, “ship captains and managers
of great corporations are normally superior servants, differing only in
the dignity and importance of their positions from those working
under them.”240
So if the concept of control is not the best proxy for the employ-
ment relationship, what provides a better touchstone?  We can look to
the Alchian-Demsetz critique of Coase for some answers.  Alchian and
Demsetz took on Coase’s notion of control by arguing that employees
received market direction just as other economic participants did.
They argued that the critical purpose behind the firm is the coordina-
tion of joint production.241  In their model, team production is
defined as “production in which 1) several types of resources are used
and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperat-
ing resource.”242  Firms are used when the team method increases
productivity, after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring
and disciplining the team.243
The critical insight is that employment is defined not by control,
but by participation—participation in team production.  It is not that
employees are controlled by the firm that makes them employees.  It
is rather that they are part of a process of joint production, acting
together within one unit.  The participants in this unit—the firm—
239 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) cmt. d (1958) (“[T]he full-time
cook is regarded as a servant [rather than as an independent contractor] although it
is understood that the employer will exercise no control over the cooking.”).
240 Id. § 220 cmt. a.  The Restatement (Third) of Agency seems to recognize this prob-
lem more overtly: “In some employment relationships, an employer’s right of control
may be attenuated.  For example, senior corporate officers, like captains of ships, may
exercise great discretion in operating the enterprises entrusted to them, just as skilled
professionals exercise discretion in performing their work.  Nonetheless, all employ-
ers retain a right of control, however infrequently exercised.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (2006).
241 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 17, at 777–79.
242 Id. at 779.
243 Id. at 780.
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have cast their lots together to engage in economic activity that would
otherwise be extremely difficult to tease out into separate contracts.
Because these players are all working together, they are treated as a
unit for certain purposes.244  The firm is responsible for the actions of
its members, and it has responsibility to those members vis-a`-vis the
fruits of its production process.
This insight is borne out in subsequent theories of the firm.  Both
the transaction costs model of the firm and the property rights model
of the firm focus on the assets of the firm, but these assets can include
human capital.245  One of the primary functions of the firm under
these theories is to organize assets such that employees continue to
work at and invest their human capital in the firm.246  Thus, the point
is to manage employee participation, rather than to control employee
conduct.  Similarly, the “power” model of the firm developed by Rajan
and Zingales revolves around the power of access to critical resources.
Both the critical resources and the access provided to them involve
the participation of various players within the process.247  Finally,
knowledge-based theories of the firm look to understand how firms
manage the production and utilization of knowledge within the
firm.248  Such processes are best understood through the lens of joint
production and employee participation.
Thus, employment is not about the employer’s control over a par-
ticular worker; control is not necessary or sufficient to the employ-
ment relationship.  Instead, what is needed is placement of the worker
within the boundaries of the firm.  Such a worker is an employee; one
who works outside those boundaries is an independent contractor.
Going forward, then, we should look to participation, not control, for
our touchstone in the legal doctrine of employment.
244 Guy Davidov has recognized that the concept of employee requires a govern-
ance structure (such as a firm) outside of the market.  He argues that structure is
necessary as “a direct result of two combined factors: first, our inclination to join
forces and work together with others; and, second, the need to coordinate production
to an extent that the market cannot satisfy.”  Davidov, supra note 19, at 377–78.
245 See supra Part III.
246 See supra Part III.
247 See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 206, at 388.
248 See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 216, at 1128 (“We show how the man-
agement of knowledge resources required in mass production and high-tech firms
differentially affects their decisional hierarchies, and in certain instances also their
compensation and ownership structure.”).
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B. Participation as Doctrine
If the key to our understandings of employment is participa-
tion—participation, that is, in an ongoing economic enterprise as
organized into a firm—then how do we operationalize this as legal
doctrine?  What would a “participation” test look like?  As it turns out,
much of the doctrine has already moved in the direction of participa-
tion; it just has not been recognized as such.  Although the notion of
control has dominated the common law test, most of the other factors
in that test reflect the degree of participation in the enterprise.  Look
at these factors in the Restatement (Second) of Agency’s test other than
control:
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occu-
pation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the local-
ity, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or
by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumen-
talities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.249
These elements, particularly (b), (e), (f), (h), (i), and (j), examine
whether the worker at issue is a participant in a continuing enterprise
or an independent actor that works outside of the firm.  They are
about firm boundaries.  Employees are those inside the firm, while
independent contractors are outside.  Participation, not control, is the
common theme.
The “participation” standard also synchronizes better with the
modern movement toward an “entrepreneurial opportunities/con-
trol” test for employee status.  The Restatement (Third) of Employment
Law describes employees as those who work in the interests of the
employer when “the employer’s relationship with the individual effec-
tively prevents the individual from rendering the services as part of an
249 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
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independent business.”250  Nonemployees, on the other hand, exer-
cise “entrepreneurial control over the manner and means by which
the services are performed.”251  This test may at first seem related to
the degree of control exercised by the employer over the details of
work, since it discusses control over the manner and means of per-
formance.  However, the overall test seems designed to capture
whether the worker is engaged with the firm’s business or rather oper-
ating independently of the firm.  In other words, is the worker part of
the firm or part of an independent business?  The D.C. Circuit’s
description of its “entrepreneurial opportunities” test is similarly firm-
oriented: it counsels that the determination of employee status should
“focus not upon the employer’s control of the means and manner of
the work but instead upon whether the putative independent contrac-
tors have a significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.”252
Participation within a firm should not be confused with formalis-
tic determinations such as whether the employee is on the payroll or is
categorized as an employee by the firm itself.  These labels are obvi-
ously useful but do not tell the whole story.  After all, some firms will
use disingenuous labeling with the purpose of avoiding the legal con-
sequences of employment.253  On the other hand, participation must
not be defined to include all those who play a role in the firm’s eco-
nomic life.  A too-broad definition of participation will engulf a variety
of nonemployees, including members of another firm that is engaging
in a joint venture or even a simple contractual relationship with the
“employer” firm.  For example, a painting company with its own
painter-employees is arguably “participating” in the economic enter-
prise of the firm that hires the company, even if no one would con-
sider its employees to be employees of the hiring firm.  A critical
component of the participation standard is that an employee must be
participating in the ongoing economic enterprise as organized into a
particular firm.  A painter hired to work at the firm through an inde-
pendent company may be doing the same painting as an employee
250 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01(1)(c) (Tentative Draft No.
2, 2009), available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/Employment%20Law%20TD%20
No%202%20-%20Revised%20-%20September%202009.pdf.
251 Id. § 1.01(2).
252 Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
253 See Carlson, supra note 11, at 298 (“[T]he advantages (to employers) of
employing workers who are plausibly not employees motivate a good deal of arbitrary
and questionable ‘non-employee’ classification.”); Davidov, supra note 19, at 363
(“Deliberate misclassification is becoming more and more common as a result of an
increased emphasis on flexibility and the new pressures of globalization.”).
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hired by the firm itself.  But the first painter is an employee of the
independent painting firm, while the second is part of the ongoing
enterprise of the firm itself.  Factors in the common law test such as
the length of the engagement, the parties named to the contract, the
method of payment, and the parties’ beliefs about the relationship all
point to the differences between an employee and an independent
contracting party, because they show whether the employee is actually
an ongoing participant in the enterprise.254  Of course, line-drawing
problems remain.  In particular, workers who would generally be seen
as part of the employer’s regular business but have been outsourced
to a clearly separate firm would pose tough questions about the mean-
ing of “participation.”  However, the participation standard would not
override existing boundaries to include workers who were clearly
outside the firm, even if the outsourcing were done for purposes of
escaping legal ramifications of employment.255
Looking at the areas of law in which employment plays a role, the
concept of “participation” arguably does a better job of defining
employee status than does control.  The doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior dictates when a firm is liable for the actions of one of its partici-
pants.  If control were the touchstone, then liability issues would focus
on the extent to which the employees’ actions were controlled by the
firm in carrying out the tortious act.  Instead, courts have generally
provided broad berth to employee actions in finding that they were
taken within the scope of employment.  Firms are liable for the
actions of their employees not because the employees were being con-
trolled, but because the employees were part of a joint enterprise, and
that enterprise should bear the costs created by its participants.  This
justification matches up with the standard theoretical defenses for
respondeat superior, which justify the doctrine based on risk-allocative
254 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(b), (f), (g), (i), (j) (1958).
255 For an argument that an employer’s decision to shift work from employees to
outside independent contractors should in some cases constitute a violation of the
underlying labor and employment law regime, see Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassifica-
tion: Tackling the Independent Contractor Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 A.B.A.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 289 (2011) (“If I am correct, then the right question to ask is
not who is an employee, but instead to what extent should firms be able to choose
organizational structures that preclude unionization by avoiding having employer-
employee relationships at all.”); see also Davidov, supra note 19, at 395–98 (discussing
“dependent contractors” as a classification of workers that are not employees but
deserve some labor-and-employment-type protections); Brian A. Langille & Guy
Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View from Canada, 21 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 22–29 (1999) (discussing the category of dependent contractors
in Canadian law).
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or retributivist theories.256  As argued in the Prosser and Keeton
treatise:
A multitude of very ingenious reasons have been offered for the
vicarious liability of a master: he has a more or less fictitious “con-
trol” over the behavior of the servant; he has “set the whole thing in
motion,” and is therefore responsible for what has happened; he
has selected the servant and trusted him, and so should suffer for
his wrongs, rather than an innocent stranger who has had no oppor-
tunity to protect himself; it is a great concession that any man
should be permitted to employ another at all, and there should be a
corresponding responsibility as the price to be paid for it—or, more
frankly and cynically, “In hard fact, the reason for the employers’
liability is the damages are taken from a deep pocket.”  None of
these reasons is so self-sufficient as to carry conviction, although
they are all in accord with the general common law notion that one
who is in a position to exercise some general control over the situa-
tion must exercise it or bear the loss. . . .
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious lia-
bility is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk.  The losses
caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are
sure to occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise, are
placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing busi-
ness.  They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged
in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience
involve harm to others through the torts of employees, and sought
to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured
plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better able to absorb
them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability insur-
ance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the commu-
nity at large.257
In other words, because the firm is the locus of joint production, and
the employee is engaged in that joint production, the firm should
bear the risk.258  This theory better explains such seemingly strange
results as the drunken-sailor cases;259 even though these employees
were acting utterly outside of the control of their firms, they were nev-
256 See T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 100 (1916); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 188 (7th ed. 2007).
257 KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 500–01 (footnotes omitted).
258 See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171–72 (2d Cir.
1968) (“The proper test here bears far more resemblance to that which limits liability
for workmen’s compensation than to the test for negligence.  The employer should
be held to expect risks, to the public also, which arise ‘out of and in the course of’ his
employment of labor.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
259 See supra Section II.B.
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ertheless participants in the firm, and the firm needed to bear the
costs of their actions within the scope of employment.  A similar the-
ory applies to criminal enterprise liability: the firm is blamed if one of
its participating employees engaged in the criminal activity within the
scope of employment and with the intent to benefit the firm.260  It
does not matter whether the employee was “controlled” by the firm in
his or her criminal activity; it only matters that the employee was par-
ticipating in the work of the firm when committing the crime.
The role of employment in intellectual property doctrine also
accords more closely to a participation theory than a control theory.
Under the work-for-hire doctrine, the employee marks the boundaries
of the firm; works made by employees within the scope of their
employment are considered property of the firm, while works made by
independent contractors are not (by default).261  Under the shop-
right doctrine, employers enjoy a non-exclusive right to use a patent
created by an employee without having to compensate the
employee.262  A shop right arises when the employee has created the
invention on the job using the employer’s materials.263  Once again,
the firm provides the context: if the employee creates the invention at
work while using the employer’s tools, the employer has a right to use
that invention without cost.264  Because the employee has been
engaged in the process of joint production, under circumstances
where it may be difficult to separate out each individual contributor’s
contributions, the employee has (impliedly) agreed that all joint prop-
erty belongs to the firm.  It is the employees’ participation within the
firm—not their control by the firm—that justifies the transfer of prop-
erty rights from individual to group.
The participation approach matches up with other recent schol-
arship considering IP rights from the perspective of the theory of the
firm.265  This scholarship uses both the transaction-costs model and
260 See, e.g., United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 249 (4th Cir. 2008) (“We have
recognized that ‘a corporation is liable for the criminal acts of its employees and
agents done within the scope of their employment with the intent to benefit the cor-
poration’” (quoting Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 63 (4th Cir. 1993))).
261 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742–43 (1989).
262 Id.
263 FISK, supra note 54, at 118.
264 Id.
265 See Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 221; Burk, supra note 54; Dan L. Burk
& Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at
the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575 [hereinafter Burk & McDonnell, The
Goldilocks Hypothesis]; Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Patents, Tax Shelters, and the
Firm, 26 VA. TAX REV. 981 (2007) [hereinafter Burk & McDonnell, Patents]; Burk &
McDonnell, supra note 56; Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66
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the property-rights model in demonstrating the connections between
intellectual property, employees, and the firm.  Using the transaction-
costs model, Robert Merges pointed to the concern about employee
opportunism and holdups to explain why employers generally hold
intellectual property rights over employee inventions.266  Comparing
a system of registered patents to a system based on contract and trade
secret protections, Paul Heald argued that patent law makes it easier
to buy and sell the information at issue.267  The patent buyer need not
enter into a costly array of contractual protections in order to keep
others (especially the sellers) from using the information and thereby
saves on transaction costs.268  Heald also argued that patents facilitate
the creation of technical information and the use of that information
in team production.269  Patents enable the critical information to be
used within the team without fear that one of the team members will
defect.270  The alternative would again be costly contracts with all
employees in the team.271  Without the need to monitor these con-
tracts, the firm can facilitate team production more efficiently.272
The property-rights theory of the firm explicitly alludes to the
importance of intellectual property.  In describing the theory, Oliver
Hart uses forms of intellectual property as examples of the “glue” that
binds employees to the firm.273  The protections for this type of prop-
erty are designed to manage not only the interactions between firms,
but also between the firm and its employees.  Dan Burk and Brett
McDonnell similarly highlight the way that intellectual property rights
balance property interests between firms as well as within firms.274
Employees have an interest in exploiting information they have cre-
ated on the job, both within the firm and outside the firm when on
the job market.275  Patent, copyright, and trade secrets each balance
OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005); Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inven-
tions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1999); Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and
Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351 (2007).
266 Merges, supra note 265, at 12–37.
267 Heald, supra note 265, at 476.
268 Id.  Such contractual efforts would likely encounter difficulties, for example, if
one of the seller’s former employees sought to use the information.
269 Id. at 487–88.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 480–84.  Heald also notes that some companies use patent applications,
which must be filed by individuals, as a way of monitoring employee performance. Id.
at 492–93.
273 HART, supra note 203, at 56–57.
274 Burk & McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis, supra note 265, at 613–24.
275 Id. at 592.
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the firm’s needs and the individual employee’s needs in separating
employee information “assets” from firm assets.276  Burk and McDon-
nell point out that this division mirrors that of agency law and the
corporate opportunity doctrine, in that the critical factors are whether
the information/opportunity arose in the context of employment with
the use of firm resources.277  Moreover, they point out that the weak-
est form of intellectual property protection—trade secret doctrine—
applies to the type of information most likely to overlap with an
employee’s own information capital.278  This balancing of rights
within firms and between firms leads to their “Goldilocks” hypothesis:
the level of legal protection of intellectual property rights that mini-
mizes transaction costs will be somewhere between a system that pro-
vides strong rights to firms and a system of weak rights for firms.279
And this calibration of legal rights is necessary to balance individual
participation with group production; the degree of control over the
individual participants is largely irrelevant.
Finally, the participation theory of employment has explanatory
power in areas of labor and employment law.  The ability of the firm’s
supervisory authorities to control the minute details of work, as
opposed to the overall scope of a project, does not explain why
employees should be singled out for protection.  An employee can
still be given largely free reign to create and produce within the firm,
and an independent contractor’s work can still be closely supervised
and monitored.  However, the notion that employees are participating
in a common enterprise explains why that enterprise would have cer-
tain obligations to those employees within that relationship.280  The
firm is not only responsible for the actions of its employees; it is also
responsible to those employees.  Employment laws are designed to
276 Id. at 593.
277 Id. at 595–97.
278 Id. at 609.  Employee covenants not to compete are also included, since their
impact intersects with intellectual property, particularly trade secrets. See id. at
628–33; see also Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 221, at 1686–88 (explaining that
covenants not to compete provide indirect protection of innovation).
279 Burk and McDonnell would calculate the level for interfirm transactions inde-
pendently from the level for intrafirm transactions, although these levels could over-
lap or even be identical once calculated.  Burk & McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis,
supra note 265, at 620–21.  Moreover, they indicate that employees are critical not
only to intrafirm analysis, but also to interfirm analysis. Id. at 632.
280 See Timothy P. Glynn, Taking Self-Regulation Seriously: High-Ranking Officer Sanc-
tions for Work-Law Violations, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 279, 324 (2011) (“[Work
law] focuses instead on enterprise liability: the employing firm, rather than individual
decision-makers acting on behalf of the enterprise, is accountable for violations of
labor and employment laws.”).
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force upon employers certain types of responsibility for their partici-
pants.  Within the common boundaries of the firm, employers have an
obligation to pay minimum wage and overtime; provide family and
medical leave; avoid discrimination; bargain with collective represent-
atives; adhere to certain requirements as to retirement and health
care benefits; and provide insurance in case of unemployment.281
Employers have the responsibility to provide these things because
employees are participants in the employer’s common enterprise.282
Team production justifies obligations from the team to the individual
members.283
At the same time, participation theory might help us articulate
why our definition of “employee” seems too crabbed or limiting when
it comes to certain types of labor and employment protections.  For
example, employers at the fringes of the labor market have used the
structure of the firm to regulate their exposure to wage and hour pro-
tections.284  Because the FLSA uses a definition of “employ” that
includes “to suffer or permit to work,”285 courts have expanded its
definition of “employee” to include workers with some degree of inde-
pendence from a traditional firm relationship.286  This exception to
the general dominance of the “control” test may signal that different
definitions of employment are appropriate.  However, it may instead
be that certain wage and hour regulations should protect workers
beyond the employment relationship.  Other countries have taken the
approach of expanding wage and hour protections to include so-
called “dependent contractors,” who may have independence from
the firm but not true independence from the economic relation-
281 See Davidov, supra note 19, at 386.
282 Cf. id. at 375–76 (arguing that “labour and employment laws are generally
designed to protect workers who appear to require this protection in their relationship
with an identifiable employer”).
283 Cf. id. at 394 (“[P]rotective labour and employment laws can be understood to
share a basic purpose . . . to minimize the extent of democratic deficits and depen-
dency in work relations and to correct unwanted outcomes of these phenomena.”).
284 For an extensive discussion of this phenomenon, see Glynn, supra note 19, at
207–15.
285 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006).
286 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that
the FLSA “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not
qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles”); see also
Nichols v. All Points Transp. Corp. of Mich., 364 F. Supp. 2d 621, 630 (E.D. Mich.
2005) (“Because the statutory definition of FMLA, unlike the definition found in
ERISA, incorporates the FLSA’s broader definition of ‘employee’ and ‘employ,’ the
court will continue to apply the ‘economic realities’ test as described by the Sixth
Circuit . . . .”).
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ship.287  Rather than lumping these dependent contractors into the
employment relationship, it may make more sense to recognize that
wage and hour protections should run to contractual as well as firm
relationships.288  Similarly, employees as well as partners deserve pro-
tection against race and sex discrimination, although Title VII only
applies to the former.289  Labor and employment laws provide a diver-
sity of regulatory schemes, and there may be good reasons to extend
some of those schemes beyond the common definition of employ-
ment.290  However, it is important first to establish a common notion
of employment, in order to give meaning to the category beyond a
chameleon-esque placeholder.  Participation theory provides the best
common definition for the category.
In addition, participation explains why employees themselves
have a duty to the firm.  The fiduciary obligations of corporate direc-
tors are well established: directors owe duties of loyalty, care, and
good faith in the exercise of their responsibilities.291  Delaware
recently extended these obligations to corporate officers as well.292
However, the common law has long maintained that even lower-level
employees owe fiduciary obligations to their employer.293  These obli-
287 See Davidov, supra note 19, at 395–98 (discussing “dependent contractors” as a
classification of workers that are not employees but deserve some labor-and-employ-
ment-type protections); Langille & Davidov, supra note 255, at 22–29 (discussing
dependent contractors in Canadian law).
288 See Glynn, supra note 19, at 227–35.
289 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
290 Davidov has arrayed the justifications for workplace regulatory regimes along a
spectrum from selective (as to employees) to universalist (as to society as a whole).
He cautions that while universalist justifications have a broad appeal, they are insuffi-
ciently tethered to the employment relationship to justify workplace regulation.  Guy
Davidov, The Goals of Regulating Work: Between Universalism and Selectivity, U. TORONTO
L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 30–31), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2205000.
291 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749–56 (Del Ch. 2005)
(describing directors’ duties of care, loyalty, and good faith).
292 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (“In the past, we have
implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of
directors.  We now explicitly so hold.” (footnotes omitted)); Glynn, supra note 280, at
326 (“[O]fficers and other high-level employees owe fiduciary duties—including a
duty of care—to the firm.”).
293 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (“Unless otherwise agreed, an
agent is subject to the duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal
in all matters connected with his agency.”); O’Neill, supra note 32, at 685 (“All
employees owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their employer—be the employer a sole
proprietor, a partnership, a close corporation, or a large, publicly traded
corporation.”).
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gations are explored in the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law,
which provides that “[e]mployees owe a duty of loyalty to their
employer in matters related to the employment relationship.”294
Employees breach the duty of loyalty by disclosing or using the
employer’s confidential information, competing with the employer,
or appropriating the property of the employer or engaging in self-
dealing.295  Under a control theory of employment, these obligations
do not really make any sense—why should those who are more con-
trolled by the firm have an obligation of loyalty to the firm?  But the
participation theory nicely explains why individual firm members
would owe duties to the ongoing enterprise of which they are a
part.296
Admittedly, participation theory does not solve a number of
extant issues with the definitions of employee and employment.  It
does not explain why some participants in a common enterprise—
family members, for example, or prisoners—are not considered to be
employees despite their compensated labor.297  It also does not differ-
entiate between employees who are simply employees and those who
are labeled as supervisors, managers, or officers and thus are excluded
from the definition of “employee” for certain purposes.298  “Control”
is sometimes used as a distinguishing factor in this context: those who
are controlled by the firm are employees, while those who control the
firm (and/or their coworkers) are not.299  But employees from the
294 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4,
2011), available at http://www.ali.org/00021333/Employment%20Law%20TD%20No
%202%20-%20Revised%20-%20September%202009.pdf.
295 Id. § 8.01(b).
296 But cf. Davidov, supra note 19, at 386 (arguing that the employee’s duty to
“obey” makes the employment relationship “one-sided”).
297 See Noah D. Zatz, Prison Labor and the Paradox of Paid Nonmarket Work, in ECO-
NOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF WORK, in 18 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK 369, 369–70
(Nina Bandelj ed., 2009) (discussing the determination that prison labor is
“noneconomic” in nature and is thus not employment); Zatz, supra note 6, at 884–92
(discussing the determination by courts that prison labor is not employment because
it is “noneconomic” in nature).  However, one answer might be that these workers are
“participants” in different enterprises: namely, the family and the prison.
298 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (excluding supervisors from the definition
of employee); id. § 2614(b)(2) (providing an exception to certain FMLA require-
ments for salaried employees who are “among the highest paid 10 percent of the
employees employed by the employer within 75 miles of the facility at which the
employee is employed”).
299 See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440,
449–51 (2003) (using the control test to determine whether doctors who were share-
holders in a professional corporation counted as employees or were instead employ-
ers and thus not categorized as employees).
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bottom to the top of the firm’s hierarchy are all participants in the
ongoing economic enterprise; those who have more power within the
firm may, in fact, be even more closely associated with it.  The purpose
of the participation standard for employment is to distinguish
between employees and independent contractors—between those
who are inside and outside of the firm.  It does not distinguish
between employees as to their roles within the firm; it does not say
which employees can be considered the “employer” for purposes of
certain labor and employment law regimes.  In those cases, control
may be a more appropriate guide.300  However, the fact that courts
have used the control test to distinguish both between employees and
independent contractors, as well as between employees and employ-
ers, provides some indication of the inherent incoherence of the test
as currently constituted.
Control is not necessary in finding a worker to be part of an
organization.  Although commentators have included the notion of
being controlled as critical to the concept of employment,301 such a
requirement (in my view) is unnecessary and limiting.  An employee
remains an employee whether in an extremely hierarchical workplace
or in a more collaborative and democratic environment.302  In fact,
the notion that employees must be controlled—must be deprived of
power within the firm—has perhaps been a self-fulfilling prophecy.303
Viewing employees as participants rather than pawns will not only
accord better with the economic reality of the modern workplace,304
300 Davidov, supra note 19, at 381 (“[C]ontrol is the concept most central to
understanding the organizational aspect of employment relationships.”).
301 Davidov has argued that the lack of participation in the control of the enter-
prise—which he terms “democratic deficits”—is one of the three “axes” of the
employment relationship, along with dependency on the relationship for the fulfill-
ment of certain social and psychological needs and economic dependency that ren-
ders it difficult to spread risks. Id. at 394.  However, he specifies that control “does
not necessarily mean control of the employer over every aspect of the production
process.” Id. at 381.  Instead, control means “the superior power of the employer vis-
a`-vis the employee within their relationship and the resulting inability of the
employee to control her own (working) life.” Id.  Although Davidov acknowledges
that these democratic deficits cannot be justified on the grounds of efficiency or
expertise, he nevertheless believes that “democratic deficits exist (to different
extents) in any employment relationship.” Id. at 380.
302 See Adler & Heckscher, supra note 226, at 59–63 (discussing the existence of
collaborative workplace communities within certain firms).
303 Cf. Zatz, supra note 255, at 288 (discussing the role of law in how firms shape
their organizational structures); Zatz, supra note 6, at 866 (discussing the “constitutive
role for employment law with respect to the boundaries of economic life”).
304 See Adler & Heckscher, supra note 226, at 12–13.
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but will also send a signal about the proper role of employees within
the organization.
C. Participation as Doctrine: Two Examples
An explanation of the “participation” test cannot hope to exhaust
the myriad situations in which the test will be called upon to differen-
tiate independent contractor from employee.  But applying the test to
particular examples may better demonstrate how the test would actu-
ally work in practice.  This Section examines how the concept of par-
ticipation might be usefully deployed to categorize two different types
of workers: delivery truck drivers and migrant agricultural workers.
The status of delivery truck drivers has arisen in a variety of con-
texts.  The National Labor Relations Board tackled their status in a set
of cases, and has gone both ways on employee status depending on
variations between the structures of the jobs.  In Roadway Package Sys-
tem, Inc., the NLRB found delivery truck drivers working for a nation-
wide package delivery company to be employees, based on their lack
of prior experience, their (de facto) exclusive arrangements with the
company, and the uniformity of their operating procedures.305  How-
ever, in a companion case, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., the NLRB
found the drivers to be independent contractors.306  The Dial-A-Mat-
tress drivers had much more flexibility in choosing and outfitting
their trucks, and their trucks displayed the name of each individual
trucker’s company.307  The NLRB has used these two cases as lodestars
in more recent analyses.308  Rather than focusing simply on the ques-
tion of control, the NLRB has considered the variety of factors listed
in section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.309  And although it
305 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 851 (1998).
306 326 N.L.R.B. 884, 884 (1998).
307 Id. at 886–87.
308 See, e.g., St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. 474, 478 (2005) (“In determining
the status of the carriers in this case, we rely on the Board’s analysis in Roadway and
Dial-A-Mattress.”).
309 The NLRB in Roadway Package System, Inc. stated:
While we recognize that the common-law agency test described by the
Restatement ultimately assesses the amount or degree of control exercised
by an employing entity over an individual, we find insufficient basis for the
proposition that those factors which do not include the concept of “control”
are insignificant when compared to those that do.  Section 220(2) of the
Restatement refers to 10 pertinent factors as “among others,” thereby specifi-
cally permitting the consideration of other relevant factors as well, depend-
ing on the factual circumstances presented. . . . Thus, the common-law
agency test encompasses a careful examination of all factors and not just
those that involve a right of control.
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is not specifically part of the list of factors in section 220, the NLRB
has used the presence of entrepreneurial opportunities as another
factor in evaluating the independence of the workers.310  As noted
earlier, the D.C. Circuit has focused in on this factor as being determi-
native.311  According to the court, the emphasis of the common law
test has shifted “away from the unwieldy control inquiry in favor of a
more accurate proxy: whether the putative independent contractors
have significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.”312
Using this standard, the circuit has found delivery drivers to be inde-
pendent contractors.  The IRS followed this approach in a set of pub-
lished guidelines on van operators; the agency found that the critical
factor is whether the drivers have the potential to realize profit or
loss.313  However, the results have largely been different in respondeat
superior cases involving drivers.314  In those cases, injuries caused by
delivery drivers were to be considered part of the costs of doing busi-
ness for the hiring company.315  In a recent Eighth Circuit decision,
the court held that a tractor-trailer driver may have been a FedEx
employee under vicarious liability despite having a separate contractor
agreement.316  A factor in the court’s determination was that the
326 N.L.R.B. at 850.
310 See, e.g., St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. at 480 (considering entrepreneurial
opportunities for newspaper deliverers).
311 See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“An
important animating principle by which to evaluate [the common law] factors . . . is
whether the positing presents the opportunities and risks inherent in entrepreneuri-
alism.”); Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(“The full-time cook and the executive are employees and the lawn-care provider is an
independent contractor not because of the degree of supervision under which each
labors but because of the degree to which each functions as an entrepreneur—that is,
takes economic risk and has the corresponding opportunity to profit from working
smarter, not just harder.”).
312 FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 497 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
313 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EMPLOYMENT TAX GUIDELINES: CLASSIFYING CERTAIN
VAN OPERATORS IN THE MOVING INDUSTRY 11–12, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-utl/van-ops.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
314 Zirkle v. Winkler, 585 S.E.2d 19, 25–28 (W. Va. 2003) (discussing cases involv-
ing newspaper delivery drivers).
315 See id. at 28 (“[W]hen an entity engaged in a commercial activity on its own
initiative places a fleet of drivers and automobiles on the public roads to accomplish a
part of its core business activity, it is at the least a reasonable inference that accounta-
bility and responsibility for the injurious results of negligence in the operation of
those automobiles should be borne by the entity engaging in the commercial
activity.”).
316 See Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 857–61 (8th Cir.
2010).
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driver was required “to look and act like [a] FedEx employee[ ] while
[he] performed FedEx services, and we believe that these provisions
show the extent of FedEx’s control over some details of [the driver’s]
work.”317
A participation approach to determining these drivers’ employ-
ment status would focus on those factors relevant to their level of par-
ticipation in the firm.  Thus, the most important Restatement factors
would be: “(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a dis-
tinct occupation or business;”318 “(e) whether the employer or the
workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work
for the person doing the work;”319 “(f) the length of time for which
the person is employed;”320 and particularly “(h) whether or not the
work is a part of the regular business of the employer.”321  The goal is
to look at the shape of the firm and determine whether the workers at
issue are properly a part of it.  Thus, additional factors would be the
extent of work that the worker did for that particular firm over time,
as well as the degree to which the firm has “branded” the employee or
her equipment for public purposes.  In the case of the FedEx drivers
before the D.C. Circuit, the delivery drivers wore FedEx uniforms and
had FedEx logos on their trucks when making deliveries.322  As the
FedEx majority admitted, “once a driver wears FedEx’s logo, FedEx has
an interest in making sure her conduct reflects favorably on that
logo.”323  As the dissent noted, the drivers “ ‘perform a function that is
a regular and essential part of FedEx Home’s normal operations,’” a
factor that other courts had repeatedly cited in their analyses.324
Similarly, migrant agricultural workers are often critical to the
operations of the farms on which they work, and thus perform a role
that is part of the normal business of the farm company.  In other
respects, however, certain arrangements can render them indepen-
dent of the firm that owns the farm itself.  As Judge Easterbrook
argued in his concurrence in Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, the migrant
workers in that case more closely resembled independent contractors
under the traditional test.325  The farm owner contracted with various
migrant worker families to pick cucumbers, generally from July
317 Id. at 859.
318 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(b) (1958).
319 Id. § 220(2)(e).
320 Id. § 220(2)(f).
321 Id. § 220(2)(h).
322 FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
323 Id. at 501.
324 Id. at 512 (Garland, J., dissenting) (quoting majority).
325 835 F.2d 1529, 1540 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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through September, paying them a piece rate of one-half of the pro-
ceeds that the farm realized on their harvest.326  Going through the
factors in the “economic realities” test, Judge Easterbrook pointed out
the ways in which the migrant workers failed to meet the test.327  The
methods the workers used in their harvesting were not monitored; the
farm only measured the output.328  The pickers received a fifty-per-
cent share in that output, and they therefore had what looked like a
significant entrepreneurial opportunity at stake.329  The length of the
engagement was brief, and the workers presumably traveled exten-
sively working with a variety of different farms across the year.330  They
were not even really dependent on this particular farm, Judge Easter-
brook contended, because they were free to pick up and move else-
where—to a different farm or even an entirely different kind of
agricultural product.331  Nevertheless, he concurred in the case
because he concluded that the purposes of the statutory scheme at
issue (the FLSA) called for the workers to be protected.332
The participation test would likely find the workers in Lauritzen to
be independent contractors.  One could argue that their role in the
core of the operations, along with the lack of a business entity inter-
mediary (other than a loosely defined “family”), would make them
participants in the firm that owned and managed the farm.  However,
the families did in fact appear to serve as mini-“firms,” with their own
structure and process for distributing the gains.333  And as Judge Eas-
terbrook found, these families seemed to exist independently of the
farm in many important respects.334  There is also no “dependency”
factor in the participation test.  Yes, participation is about the “eco-
nomic realities” of whether a set of workers is actually participating in
a firm, despite how their legal relationship may be structured.  But in
this case, the realities pointed in many ways toward independence.
While I am arguing that the participation test is the best way to
define employees, that does not mean I would not want the Lauritzen
workers to be excluded from the FLSA.  “Suffer or permit to work”
means something more expansive than the traditional notion of
employment, and therefore the definition should go beyond the con-
326 Id. at 1532 (majority opinion).
327 Id. at 1540–43 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
328 Id. at 1540 & n.2.
329 Id. at 1540.
330 Id. at 1541.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 1544 (“The functions of the FLSA call for coverage.”).
333 Id. at 1532–33 (majority opinion).
334 Id. at 1540–41 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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cept of employment itself.  Other countries have endeavored to cover
this pool of workers who are outside of employment but deserve pro-
tection through a category called “workers” or “dependent contrac-
tors.”335  These laborers do not meet our traditional standards of
participation within the firm, but they are sufficiently dependent and
vulnerable that they should be encompassed within certain types of
protections targeted to vulnerable workers.  Guy Davidov has
described these workers as meeting the economic axes of dependency
and an inability to spread risks, but not the organizational axis of hav-
ing a democratic deficit.336  Because he describes employment as “a
structure of governance with democratic deficits,”337 Davidov acknowledges
that dependent contractors do not meet that definition.338  He never-
theless argues that labor and employment law protections should
extend to these workers because of the purpose of these protections
vis-a`-vis vulnerable workers.339  I agree with Davidov’s result.  Employ-
ees should be limited to those who participate in firms, but some
employment protections (such as the FLSA) should extend to workers
like Lauritzen’s migrant farm harvesters who, because of their depen-
dency and market-devalued personal capital, risk getting less than the
minimum wage or putting their children to work.340  But rather than
morphing our definition of “employee” to fit the needs of the particu-
335 See Davidov, supra note 10, at 57, 61 (discussing the United Kingdom’s
“worker” category and Canada’s “dependent contractor” category).
336 Davidov, supra note 19, at 395.
337 Id. at 377.
338 Davidov, supra note 10, at 61–62.
339 Davidov, supra note 166, at 151.
340 Unmentioned in Lauritzen was another potential vulnerability of the migrant
agricultural workers—their immigration status.  The case was filed before passage of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which imposed significant
new penalties of employers for hiring workers without legal authorization to work
within the United States. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
Prior to the IRCA, employers had been allowed to hire undocumented immigrants.
L. Tracy Harris, Note, Conflict or Double Deterrence? FLSA Protection of Illegal Aliens and the
Immigration Reform and Control Act, 72 MINN. L. REV. 900, 900 & n.3 (1988).  However,
the IRCA also legalized certain seasonal migrants and created temporary migrant
worker programs. See Melissa Keaney & Alvaro M. Huerta, Restrictionist States Rebuked:
How Arizona v. United States Reins in States on Immigration, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y
249, 252 (2013); Hiroshi Motomura, Designing Temporary Worker Programs, 80 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263, 271 (2013).  The ability of employers to threaten deportation increases
their power over undocumented workers and renders such workers even more vulner-
able to labor and employment abuses. See John Bowe, Nobodies, NEW YORKER, Apr. 21
& 28, 2003, at 106 (discussing the abusive and dangerous working conditions for
undocumented citrus and tomato pickers in Florida).
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lar statutory scheme, we should keep the definition constant and add
other categories, such as “dependent contractors,” when
appropriate.341
V. THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE LAW
The preceding discussion assumes the continuing vitality of the
concept of employment within the law.  However, both the employ-
ment relationship and the firm itself—at least, in its most common
legal persona of the corporation—have questionable long-term pros-
pects.  The corporation is under siege by a plethora of new organiza-
tional structures, most notably the limited liability company (LLC).
When the Treasury moved to “check-the-box” taxation for these new
entities, they became viable alternatives to the corporation in a variety
of different fields.342  The flexibility of the LLC form is in contrast to
many of the requirements, state and federal, placed upon the corpora-
tion.343  It seems, perhaps, as if Jensen and Meckling’s “nexus of con-
tracts” model344 is coming to life in the LLC, and the corporation’s
failure to live up to their model is bringing it down.345
The employment relationship is moving from firm to market as
well.  In the mid-twentieth century, labor economists identified the
internal labor market as a deviation from neoclassical labor market
theory.346  These economists found that employees largely stayed
within one firm for their lifetime of employment, and that firms gen-
341 Cf. Davidov, supra note 166, at 151 (arguing for “a unified definition of
‘employee’ for protective labour and employment regulations, based on their com-
mon goals, while allowing room for extensions or exceptions in particular instances”).
I disagree with Davidov to the extent that I believe the definition of “employee”
should be held constant across the law as a whole, and should be based on our con-
ception of employment, rather than the goals of labor and employment regimes.
342 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2004); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE
UNCORPORATION 121 (2010).
343 Moreover, when it comes to the public corporation, commentators have sug-
gested that more firms have gone private because of the regulatory requirements
layered upon the public corporation.  William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After
Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 143 (2006) (discussing
evidence that smaller issuers are being forced out of public markets). But see Robert
P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on
Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 10 (2009) (arguing that Sarbanes-
Oxley is not to blame for the high-profile “going private” transactions of the last
decade).
344 Coase, supra note 12, at 388 (discussing the firm in the context of employer-
employee relationships).
345 RIBSTEIN, supra note 342, at 119–35.
346 STONE, supra note 48, at 51–63.
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erally used internal promotion to fill vacancies.347  These findings
established an empirical basis for Coase’s notion of the importance of
employment to the firm.348  Moreover, internal labor markets are an
instantiation of the separateness of the firm from the market; they
demonstrate that the firm is truly a different set of economic relation-
ships.349  However, economists are finding that the importance of
internal labor markets has been dwindling.350  Beginning in the
1970s, firms began to hire more temporary and contingent workers.351
This trend accelerated through the 1990s, and continues apace.352
Recent reports indicate that the 2008 recession has turned many
employees into “permanent” temporary workers; even in 2005, as
much as twenty-six percent of the workforce reportedly had “nonstan-
dard” jobs.353  And the effects go beyond low-skill and low-wage
employment; executive officers, lawyers, and scientists are all among
the temporarily employed.354  Moreover, “outsourcing”—a word of
relatively recent vintage—continues to break down relationships that
were traditionally within the firm.355  What Alan Hyde said in 1998
continues to be true today: “Increasingly, labor is hired through short-
term, market-mediated arrangements that may not be ‘employment’
relations in any legal or technical sense of that word.”356
If the corporation is giving way to a more contractually oriented
form of business enterprise, and the employment relationship is dis-
solving back into the market, then perhaps corporations (or their suc-
cessor organizational forms) will exist only to structure financial
relationships and confer limited liability.  There is reason to believe,
however, that the firm and the corporation will remain relevant to our
economic system.  From the organizational perspective, the role of the
“uncorporation” remains limited under current law.357  It seems likely
347 Id. at 51–52.
348 See Coase, supra note 12, at 387–88.
349 STONE, supra note 48, at 52–56.
350 Id. at 67–72.
351 Id. at 68–70.
352 Id. at 74–83.
353 Coy et al., supra note 21, at 35.
354 STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE xi–xiii (2008); Coy et al., supra note 21,
at 36.
355 See Margaret M. Blair, Erin O’Hara O’Connor, & Gregg Kirchhoefer, Outsourc-
ing, Modularity and the Theory of the Firm, 2011 BYU L. REV. 263, 265; George S. Geis, An
Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions, 96 VA. L. REV. 241, 243
(2010); George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99,
110 (2009).
356 Hyde, supra note 23, at 99.
357 RIBSTEIN, supra note 342, at 119.
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that not only will the public corporation survive, but it will be made
even less contractual after the passage of finance reform legislation.358
And in the employment context, the flight from employment seems
driven by an effort to avoid employment-related regulations and
restrictions, rather than the disappearance of the firm itself.359  In
fact, many employers are looking to tie their employees even more
closely to the firm and its image.360  The importance of “brand” for
businesses means that employees are critical to reifying and promot-
ing the brand, especially in service industries.361  Firms have used
branding to draw out psychological commitments from employees
that are not reciprocal on the part of the employer.362  Participation
by enthusiastic employees is becoming more important to the role of
the firm, not less.
In fact, it may be that the tide is turning back to a more
employee-oriented workplace.  Popular management literature
emphasizes the importance of the employee.363  Small startups, partic-
ularly in the tech industry, are once again blurring the line between
entrepreneur and employee.364  Academia is evolving as well.  As dis-
cussed earlier, recent research into the theory of the firm has focused
on the importance of knowledge-based assets and the distribution of
access to those assets within the firm.365  As we learn more about the
importance of trust, norms, and procedural justice within the corpora-
tion, employees will grow even more in importance.366
358 The legislation paves the way for new regulations on compensation commit-
tees, say-on-pay proposals, and proxy access for director nominations.  Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 951–952,
971, 124 Stat. 1899, 1899–1903, 1915 (2010).
359 See Coy et al., supra note 21, at 35.
360 See Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping,
and the New Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 13, 18–20 (2007).
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It is possible to envision a radically individualized future, in which
each worker is a “corporation” unto herself and firms are merely tem-
porary agglomerations within the global market.367  It is also possible
to envision a future in which employees participate at the highest
levels of governance, and corporations are tools of team production
rather than investor enrichment.  Perhaps both of these futures are in
store, to varying degrees within different industries.  Further explora-
tion into the role of the firm will enable us to better understand these
changes and manage them efficiently through the legal system.
CONCLUSION
To better understand the meaning of employment, we need to
look to the organizational structures that create the employment rela-
tionship.  We recognize a category of “employees” because we recog-
nize the employers that harness their collective labor in pursuit of a
common economic enterprise.  By looking to the literature on the
theory of the firm, we can better understand the importance of
“employment” as an economic and legal concept, and we can better
define that role to meet the definitional needs of various doctrines.
At this point in our history, it makes sense to consider an employee to
be one who participates in joint production within the context of a
firm, rather than one who is controlled by an employer.  Such a con-
ception of employment as participation will enable us to better under-
stand the reasons why we have a common conception of employment
that ribbons throughout our law.  Because employees participate
within a firm, they are responsible to the firm, and the firm is respon-
sible both to and for them.
We currently are a nation largely of employees.  But that could
change.  In the end, it will be our approach to the concept of firms
that will dictate whether the employment relationship—as defined in
law—is a historical anachronism or a basis for continued common
production.  By better understanding the nature of employment and
better framing it as a legal concept, we can understand its strengths
and limitations as a legal tool and employ that tool properly in the
future.
367 Grant Hayden and I discuss this possibility in a forthcoming article: Grant M.
Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Larry from the Left: An Appreciation, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2340618.
